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Prologue
At this historical moment, one rarely dares to claim that one does not want justice,
or equality. Governments claim to provide justice through the law, international human
rights institutions such as the United Nations claim to peruse a more just world through
its human rights apparatus. Military interventions that caused war and colonized countries
in the name of giving justice obviously claimed to want to be just as well. Seemingly,
everybody wants justice. Whereas justice seems to be everywhere and nowhere. The
question of justice is one that has been asked for millennia and it is not one that I claim to
answer in this thesis.While questioning justice is a valid endeavor, answering such a
profound question is impossible. Throwing a woman or man in jail for stealing bread
because he/she cannot feed their family given that the economic system is built in a way
that produces rich and poor is, to some people, perceived as justice. And this is the
simplest example where the concept of justice fails - to begin with. Therefore in my quest
I intend to interrogate how justice is perceived rather than what justice is. This thesis
hence explores contemporary perceptions of justice through an analysis of discourses
surrounding the rule of law in a feminist collective Nasawiya and the women rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Kafa in Lebanon. I carefully examine the tensions
between activists and academics concerning the country’s domestic violence law. This
thesis seeks to intervene in the production of knowledge(s) concerning law from both
academic and Lebanese activist standpoints. Some activists in Beirut argue that
academics come from a position of privilege, especially those among them who are very
prominent in the US academia. Activists usually argue that those academics are not in
direct contact with violence, unlike the women that are living with everyday violence .
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Consequently, so the argument, their life does not depend on the law as that of the
women that navigate violence in their lives. This leaves a very narrow space for
questioning the rule of law and silences the kinds of questions and concern raised by
academics.
As a member of these activist circles, upon pursuing my MA exposure to
academic debates on the limits of law and the UN system, opened up new perspectives
and questions regarding the often taken for granted questions concerning justice. Marx
argues that the world is concealed from us, where all we see from the process of
production is the end product, which by itself blinds us to the power hierarchies of
exploitation that take place in order for us to get this end product. Therefore in this thesis
I use the same analogy in order to argue that the way in which the law of domestic
violence surfaced as a fetish for the feminist movement in Beirut is based on similar
politics of concealment. Change and strategies of resistance do not happen in a vacuum
but in a certain historical moment and in a specific geographical location where most of
the world of politics is concealed from us. It is out of this deep awareness that I decided
to pursue this thesis in which I argue that an emancipatory feminist project that defines its
aspirations within the boundaries of, and in compatibility with, hegemonic reform
agendas cannot lead to transformative possibilities.
Following fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon, followed by fifteen years of
oppressive rule by the Syrian regime, the attraction to international human rights
discourse is understandable, with little attention given to the complexities of notions of
justice articulated by UN rights agendas. Therefore in this thesis I aim to push the debate
beyond the hegemonic perception of justice and equality that is provided (not to say
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imposed) by international human rights institutions. I question what is at stake when a
feminist collective with radical left politics such as Nasawiya becomes absorbed in
neoliberal modes of thinking based on the international human rights language at the
expense of formulating its own agendas. I ask what are the costs if we kept engaging in
the perpetual legitimization of state and rigidified state control through the lobbying for
laws, how is emancipation possible within pre-tailored perceptions and strategies of
achieving justice as an end product that disregards the fact that the world is in constant
motion and freezes justice in time. Therefore this thesis proposes to carefully examine the
imbrications of Lebanese women’s movements with the juridical regulatory complex
derived from the global gender governance infrastructure and its effects on the
articulation of a vision for other futures.
“I have nothing more to do here," the little prince said to the king.
"So I shall set out on my way again.
Do not go," said the king, who was very proud of having a subject.
"Do not go. I will make you a Minister!
Minister of what? Said the little prince
Minster of−− of Justice! Said the king
But there is nobody here to judge! Said the little prince
Hum! Hum! said the king. "I have good reasons to believe that somewhere on
my planet there is an old rat. I hear him at night. You can judge this old rat.
From time to time you will condemn him to death. Thus his life will depend
on your justice”. – The Little Prince
At this very moment, the lives of women in Lebanon are dependent on state justice
that has proved again and again to curb every law to fit its agenda. It is obviously the
perfect timing for questioning the efficiency of the law in providing justice with the
recent passing of Lebanon’s domestic violence law. The committee studying the law
managed to manipulate and distort the law to the extent that it institutionalized marital
rape. In the domestic violence law that was passed, sex with the husband became a right
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rather than an act of consent and desire. This premise goes against the feminist narrative
that the NGOs and collectives are working on and lobbying for. I chose to highlight this
specific point because even though the religious rules of marriage are discussed
differently between Muslims, Christians, and Druze, it is the first time that sex is
mentioned as a right in a civil code. Thus martial rape is now legal in a written law that
was passed, the outcome of six years of mobilization by feminist collectives. The law that
passed is mostly against everything they believe in. After six years of activism, ‘the
domestic violence law’ serves the state, giving it a tool for more control rather than it
being an emancipatory tool.
As I wrote this thesis I wondered how long would the state take to show its real
face. It didn’t take long. Therefore this thesis is an experiment to think of strategies
beyond the law. The law as a strategy might be something we cannot escape, but I make
this statement with a lot of discomfort. Why are we then working within such an
oppressive tool that dictates an unequivocal way of achieving justice with no other
alternatives?

Certainly victories through the law were sometimes achieved, if these

victories never existed, the state and the rule of law, I contend, would not have continued
to exist as we know them now. These small victories that we achieve through the rule of
law are what drags us into staying within its vicious cycle. Oppression does not sustain
itself on big losses of human rights or imagined liberation. It sustains itself on small
victories. These anesthetic anecdotes of liberation are the food outside the cage of the rat
wheel in which we are stuck. The scarier, or rather hopeful question, would be what will
happen once we realize that.
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Chapter One
The UN-touchables:1 The UN and feminism in Lebanon
“Is this all we can hope for” Wendy Brown
Introduction
This thesis is a process of questioning and understanding. It is also an invitation to
begin by tackling social problems in a different way: by asking questions rather than
looking at the world as if it is static, where one solution can be the answer. Through this
research I try to unpack the complexity of activism under neoliberalism. Moreover I try
to problematize the forces of gender governance that via its international institutions
constantly attempt to absorb feminist collectives by limiting possibilities to rupture
hegemonic narratives of the UN, global legal imaginations that at this moment in history
articulate, arbitrate and define justice, assigning ongoing problems of justice to issues of
local implementation. This discourse of the UN disregards the social and economic
situations that produce the injustices UN legal infrastructures presume to fight against.
Thus this thesis is an attempt to push beyond these discourses and unpack the social and
economical situations that produce injustices.
I problematize the category of law in Lebanon through an analysis of the
mobilization of the feminist collective Nasawiya and the women rights non-governmental
organization (NGO) Kafa. Based on my fieldwork I begin by examining how activists in
both groups perceive the efficiency of the Lebanese domestic violence law in providing

1

I do realize that the word untouchable can be understood as the untouchable cast in south east Asia, especially in India
and Nepal, whom are perceived as the subalterns in the cast hierarchy of Hindu practices. But in this research the UNtouchables is a play on words that tries to render the united nation as an institution that have become above critic thus
became untouchable, with a lot of stakes in its influence on the political sphere of feminisms.
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justice and equality to women in Lebanon. I trace how the domestic violence law has
turned into a commodity desired and fetishized by these activist groups. Finally, I
unpack the imagination of the activists I interviewed and analyze them in terms of
imagining emancipation as a process of becoming rather than a static goal. Through out
this thesis I try to break out of the dogmatism of problem solving solutions and push my
analysis towards imagining a movement that pushes beyond problem solving discourses,
in other words, a movement that asks questions instead of finding solutions.
The thesis seeks to gain a fuller understanding of three sets of questions: First,
what is the influence of hegemonic human rights language and how rooted is it in the
feminist collective Nasawiya? What is the relationship of both Nasawiya and Kafa to the
state? Second, what women’s rights issues are made visible in Lebanon now and what are
the relationships of these acts of making visible to international women’s rights agendas
as prioritized in international gender governance and the UN system? Third, how are
these issues discussed locally, among whom, and who is included in the debate and who
is excluded and with what implications and for what effects? These questions are driven
by ongoing debates in Lebanon regarding the women’s movement. Given the role of UN
discourses/programs on gender governance, it is noteworthy that there is hardly any
critical literature analyzing its impact on the Arab region in particular. The vast majority
of scholarly work has focused singularly on questions of effectivity and implementation.

Literature Review
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Human rights activism has been the predominant framework over the past twenty
years through which social movements articulate their aspirations. Human rights are
defined as the ability to protect one self against injustice and degradation of dignity.
(Brown, 2004.) It is in these present values where rights get reproduced and where
hypothetically speaking, everybody has rights, while the present political events is a
radical indicator that human rights are not for everyone. Humanity and by humanity I
mean the level of being treated as a human being with rights, is sadly being defined by a
person’s class, gender, sexual orientation, color, ethnicity, background, education, career,
passports, geographical location and so on. For many activists rights and human rights
have become the framework for formulating resistance to patriarchy, colonialism,
oppression, and the struggle for human equality, justice, freedom and women rights. The
latter terms surfaces consistently throughout my fieldwork interviewing people about
violence against women and laws. In asking my questions I attempted to interrogate the
value of these terms compared to their value as essential concepts to human life, and
hence make visible how these terms are being emptied from their content. For example
the term ‘justice’ is a very popular one, but what justice is and how do people imagine
justice matters. Words without content and meaning, without regards to how they
circulate and are used, after all are just letters organized. On the other hand, in trying to
understand the “complex power of apprehending the present” an increasing body of
critical work has emerged suggesting that human rights have become the “guise in which
globalization of capital drapes itself” (Brown 2004, p.451).
Agier (2010) argues that humanitarian aid and agencies function as the left hand
of the empire operating as the emergency solution in crisis, while at the same time
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feeding into creating and reproducing crisis itself. The definition of a human being in
human rights discourse based on the declaration of human rights, gets abstracted within a
universalist language that defines the state as essential in the protection of it’s subjects,
where the human being becomes defined only as that which distinguishes itself from the
non humans (Assad, 2007, p.5). Building on this critical body of work, this thesis is
premised on an understanding of human rights discourses as another form of neoliberal
globalization that strategically deploys the rights’ language for its particular objectives
(Amar 2009). Cornwall, Geidon & Wilson, (2008) join many other recent critical
feminist analyses suggesting ways in which the notion of empowerment functions as a
tool for depoliticizing feminist social movements and turning them into NGOs that work
in offices and provide services instead of working towards social change. In their
respective influential work Fraser (2010) and Menon (2004) explore the justice complex
variously showing how justice can never be impartial within the hierarchies of power.
For an emancipatory feminist project the imperative to define its aspirations within the
boundaries of, and in compatibility with, hegemonic reform agendas cannot lead to
transformative possibilities. This thesis proposes to carefully examine the imbrications of
Lebanese women’s movements with the juridical regulatory complex derived from the
global gender governance infrastructure and its effects on the articulation of a vision for
other futures. Moreover this thesis tries to understand how neoliberal agenda of global
governance works as a tool of absorption of feminist collectives in order to absorb them
into the current system that works with governments and laws instead of questioning
them.
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The Articulation of Human Rights within the Feminist Collective
This thesis intends to understand the entanglement of human rights language with
feminism through my discussions with activists in Nasawiya and Kafa. The most
challenging part of writing this thesis was the fact that the same views of feminism which
I analyze and critique were shaped by constant debates and political practices that I
encountered and gained by being part of the Nasawiya feminist collective. At the same
time, this critique comes from a deep sense of realization that we need to be critical and
analytical in order to be able to grow and flourish be it on the personal or collective level.
I provide the reader with a genealogy of Nasawiya as a participant and observer of some
of the events that took place since its foundation in 2008.

Introducing Nasawiya and Kafa
What had attracted me to Nasawiya when it first began was its feminist, nonwomen rights, discourse, a discourse that furthermore did not view and categorize
Lebanese people according to sects. Up until today there are people in Nasawiya that I
met of whom I know nothing about their religion and sect because it simply did not
matter. To the reader that might be something insignificant, yet in the context of Lebanon
these locations within the social domain get mapped (or asked) within minutes of any
conversation. Nasawiya in that sense was special. State feminists and other women’s
rights groups very quickly perceived Nasawiya as a radical ‘non-conventional’ group,
one that was received with critical scrutiny, but also a group with which alliances around
particular issues were possible.
Nasawiya’s enagement with Lebanese women’s politics are best exemplified by
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their critical engagement with the Arab Women’s Forum platform, organized by state
feminists and headed by the Lebanese president’s wife Wafaa Soulieman, to engage the
‘Arab Spring’ that was held in one of Beirut’s five star hotels. A group of feminists in
Nasawiya came together at the end of January 2012 in order to write a critique of the
event, among others pointing out core problems in state feminist practices such as
holding an event at a five star hotel with a USD 300 attendance fee. Writing in Arabic,
the critique focused in particular on the exclusion of the domestic violence and rape law
from its agenda:
It is obvious that the Forum's agenda does not intend to transgress
the red line of the discourses of the state and religious figures,
this purposefully silences many other voices that want the domestic
violence law to be passed as it is…
When the Forum speaks of women and economy as one of the
issues it is tackling, it is inviting powerful businesswomen to talk
about the economy, marginalizing working class and
unemployed women. Furthermore, in our vision any political
democratic change in the Arab world should work in parallel
on issues of social justice. Replacing one political figure
with another while preserving the socio-economic status quo,
is a discourse that tries to maintain rather than change the
situation…
Since the Women’s Forum addresses women in the Arab Spring,
it cannot ignore the importance of the need to end military rule
and royal reigns … As for asking for women’s quotas in the
government, we don't see that the problem limited to
women not being represented in the government, but
in the core of the sectarian political system that does not
allow anyone a real just representation in the government.
The collective ended the statement by asking:
What type of Arab Spring exactly is it that will flourish
in a march for women that takes place between
the Four Seasons Hotel and downtown Beirut.
(Excerpts are my own translation)
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The critique was issued as a press release and was signed as “feminist activists”
and represents the political agenda and activisms that define the core political values of
Nasawiya, that is, the struggle against not only sexism but also classism, racism,
sectarianism, military and royal reigns, the mode of governance by the Lebanese state
and state feminism. These political principles resonate with my own understanding of
feminism as one that does not normalize the state and views injustice as a complex and
imbricated phenomena. While conflicts regarding leadership, political agendas are part
of all collective work, with the ‘Take Back the Parliament Initiative’ (to be elaborated on
later) Nasawiya underwent numerous changes, leading to the departure of many of its
members, myself included.
Before this rupture, in its first six years key projects of Nasawiya included ‘Salwa
for Fighting Sexual Harassment,’ ‘The Feminist Tools for Change,’ ‘Take Back the
Tech,’ ‘The Anti Racism Movement (ARM)’ ‘Meem' (a queer women support group)
and ‘Sawt Al Niswa’ (a feminist zine). Salwa aimed towards fighting sexual harassment
through spreading awareness in the streets, host events and feature television
advertisements that center on a cartoon character with a super power bag called Salwa.
For example, one of Salwa’s television spots featured Salwa getting harassed by her boss
at work where her boss tries to kiss her after telling her she got a raise. She fumes with
anger and slaps him with her bag and leaves work. Another was about Salwa being cat
called names in the streets where she stands up for harassment and defends herself. The
third was about Salwa being harassed by a family member inside her house as a child,
when her mother finds out, beats the harasser, kicks him out and give Salwa the famous
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bag that works as a self-defense kit. Salwa’s target audience was basically children and
teenagers.
The ‘Feminist Tools for Change’ initiative targeted women in Beirut and in towns
and villages throughout Lebanon to engage in a conversation with women about their
rights. The initiative ARM focused on racism against migrant domestic workers in
Lebanon, and assisted in setting up migrant workers support networks. It provides
migrant domestic worker’s with a space to establish their own communities that mobilize
against various modes of oppression and racism. ARM established a community center
for migrant domestic workers, and organizes a a domestic worker parade on May 1 every
year and mobilizes against the Kafala law. Meem is a queer women group initiative that
provides a space for queer and transgendered/transsexual people to form support groups,
discuss politics, and produce written narratives of their own history. Meem also hosts an
online zine Bekhsoos and published Bareed Mista’jil, a book that tackles the lives,
challenges and success stories of queer and trans people in Lebanon. Finally, ’Take Back
the Tech’ provides summer campus for young women interested in becoming involved in
technology.
Since its foundation in 2008, Nasawiya has mobilized for protests against sexual
harassment, domestic violence, rape and marital rape. It hosts a protest march every
March 8 on international women’s day. In preparation two days prior to the march
members of the collective engage women on the streets in Beirut, and other towns and
villages across Lebanon around diverse topics, such as “do you think women have their
rights in Lebanon?” or “what type of change do you think should happen in Lebanon?” It
has engaged debates and mobilized against the sectarian system in Lebanon, the
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Palestinian cause and BDS. Nasawiya, as I experienced it, was a highly political space
with radical anti-sectarian politics. The latter is a significant aspect of Nasawiya, within
the highly charged sectarian political space of Lebanon it is rare to find such spaces.
Nasawiya organized a protest on the 8th of March on international women’s day.
The other subject of study is Kafa. I was introduced to Kafa through my
membership in Nasawiya in 2008. My interaction with Kafa was mediated through my
work with Nasawiya, in particular as a volunteer lobbying for the passing of the antidomestic violence law Kafa was working on. Hence, I introduce Kafa through their
website mission statement (2014)
Established in 2005 by a group of multi-disciplinary professionals
and human rights activists, KAFA (enough) Violence & Exploitation
is a Lebanese non-profit, non-political, non-confessional civil
society organization committed to the achievement of gender-equality
and non-discrimination, and the advancement of the human rights of
women and children. KAFA’s mission is to work towards eradicating
all forms of gender-based violence and exploitation of women and
children through advocating for legal reform and change of policies
and practices, influencing public opinion, and empowering women
and children. Our focus areas are those of 1) Violence against
Women 2) Child Sexual Abuse 3) Exploitation and Trafficking
in Women 4) Socio-Legal Counseling
Kafa always played the role of lobbying in the anti-domestic violence law, while
Nasawiya mobilized for protests in collaboration with Kafa, Nasawiya took a more
militant approach to asking for the passing of the law through protests, articles, and social
media campaigns that did not compromise on the passing of the law as drafted by Kafa.
Even though I present Nasawiya as a radical left collective, it is important to note that
Nasawiya does not exist outside the human rights language. Despite the progressive postcolonial rhetoric of this collective, the language and categories deployed remain
embedded in global governance discourses especially those of human rights. This
contradiction elaborates on how many scholars among them Harvey ( ) and Savater ( )
19

continue to argue that neoliberalism is not only a mode of thinking but also have become
a way of life. It infiltrates every detail of the everyday and no matter how resistant people
are to it, neoliberalism manages to accommodate difference and transform it. This raises
the question as to what is at stake if this language of human rights that lobbies for
juridical laws to protect women is the predominant way in which the Lebanese feminist
collective debates and imagines emancipation. Building on Nivedita Menon’s (2004)
argument that human rights vocabulary seeks to establish tools in which universalist
modes of intervention into state practices takes place, this thesis will argue that
understanding the global political terrain and its impact on the region is imperative in
order to go beyond dominant discourses in which the region, states and communities are
variably racialized and culturized as other with ineffective or non-compliant adherence to
neoliberalism’s norms and forms.
Imagining the Lebanese State
A country that is already overrun with guns and drugs
and anxiety, grating with xenophobia and sexism
and riddled with chronic electricity and water
cuts, groaning infrastructure, a criminal and
parasitic political class, and a seemingly endless
tolerance for stasis (Makdashi, 2013).
In order to form a better understanding of the context in which these two groups
function, there is a need to draw on the history of Lebanon itself, and unravel the various
political histories that produce the present. Here I find it crucial to reflect on how
challenging it was to capture one historical account that narrates the most recent history
of Lebanon, given that various political groups, after the civil war produced their own
sectarian narratives about the civil war. It is important to note that understanding
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Lebanon - as it is produced - as an exception is a simplistic analysis that isolates Lebanon
as place outside of the history of the rest of the world. Lebanon is produced as an
exception to the world due to its historical civil war, and its eighteen sects that are in
perpetual conflict among each other. Thus there’s a need to complicate this view about
Lebanon to begin with.
Within the modern imagination of states, and within the perpetual aspiration of
forming nation states, nations are built on the premises that there is one national identity
that should unite the citizens that live within certain nation states borders in order to form
a nation. This production of nationalism is sensitive and allergic to difference. This act
manifests itself in various geographical locations in different ways. In the Lebanese case,
the failure to form one national identity within the imagination of modern Lebanon, given
the diverse sects resulted in a civil war that lasted for fifteen years. The civil war of
course was not only a result of the formation of nation state, but as well due to various
class and race issues. Nation states cannot exist by themselves; they exist in relation to an
opposite. Lebanon for example is not Lebanon by itself; it is Lebanon because it is not
Syria, or Egypt. It is as well a product of colonialism.
Lebanon has been historically a jigsaw of religious-ethnic communities, which
share a long history of continuous conflict. Qubain argues that the Christians during the
French mandate allied with colonial powers for protection against the Arabisation of the
region (Qubain, 1961, p.29). Postcolonial Lebanon as a state was built on fractions. It is
worthy here to mention that since the Christians allied with the French mandate for
protection, the Christians were given more privileges in terms of development;,
infrastructure and education. This widened the gap between the various Christian and
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Muslim communities. Since the founding of the Lebanese state, the unequal divide of
wealth and development which privileged Christians over Muslims has been one of the
reasons for the underlying tensions between both religions (Salibi, 1988 p.35).
The latter, along with the aspiration of forming a united nation state, is one of the
very basic reasons that lead to the civil war in 1975. Qubain (1969) argues that the
Christians in Lebanon insisted that they are the majority irrespective of historical
demographics, thus wanting more representation in the government. Christian
communities in Lebanon such as the Maronites consider themselves to be the founders of
the Lebanese state and have clashed in the past with the Druze community and, during
the 1975-76 civil war, with most of the Muslim communities (Kilot, 1987).
The Lebanese war was marked with military intervention from three sides: the
Israeli, the Syrian, and the Palestinian. Resulting from historical clashes between
different sects – where the Christians wanted to be identified with the west, and most of
the Muslim sects wanted to adopt a pan Arab identity – the Lebanese identity was
founded on the ground of difference and opposing binaries between the Arab and western
identity.
This identity conflict serves today as a tool of the Lebanese government to sustain
itself. This constant production of sects as others to each other is one of the reasons that
legitimize the existence of the Lebanese government as the protector of the national
unity. Moreover, the sectarian civil war fear propagated by state is one that works in
favor of the Lebanese government members that are the same political class that
governed through the civil war and up until today. The legitimization of their existence
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and their reign is derived from a constant fear that if this political class falls another civil
war might take place.
This constant production of difference as a tool manifests itself in the trials that
took place to stop the civil war. The first step toward stopping the war was the Taif
Agreement. It institutionalized the cementing of differences that are in perpetual
competition. Consequently after the Taif Agreement, power was divided between the
various sects and representation in the government was given to all sects by law. That
said, Mikdashi (2013) describes Lebanon now as “a country that is already overrun with
guns and drugs and anxiety, grating with xenophobia and sexism and riddled with chronic
electricity and water cuts, groaning infrastructure, a criminal and parasitic political class,
and a seemingly endless tolerance for stasis” (Ibid). This description captures the core of
the conflictual everyday that defines the contemporary everyday in Lebanon. Mikdashi
also notes that “The word “sectarianism” fails to capture the nature of these disputes over
Lebanon's future and its geopolitical alliances” (Mikdashi, June 5, 2012). Rather, it’s a
system that produces identities as primarily sectarian especially once they get politicized.
Lebanon is currently mostly run by the militia leaders that participated in the 1975-1990
civil war (Mikdashi, June 5, 2012), who still practice their governmental jobs with
impunity.
On the other hand it is often argued that history itself is problematic, especially
Lebanese history since it is up until today that there is no one history book that is taught
in all schools, or a historical narrative that is told by people similarly. For example in
1984, an article was published by Massarat (2012) about including the civil war in history
books in the school curriculum where he argues that documenting history builds the
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memory of the Lebanese and helps in orienting their behavior, moreover he objected to
the fact that the civil war is not being taught in school. Years later, a similar article was
published by Daccache in 2012 (Memory at work, 2012) titled “So that the history gets
forgotten before it’s written”. Where he objected to the fact that history books that are
being taught in school stop at the World War II. During these years, many articles were
written in newspapers that objected to the marginalization of the civil war from the
Lebanese history curriculums and taken as a sign of erasing memory. If books as argued
by Dawson and Roper (2000) are vehicles of memory where certain knowledge gets
transferred to a group of people, then a certain type of knowledge transfer up until today
has failed to capture the Lebanese history. Memory is political in the sense that memories
are produced out of experiences – experiences of interactions with others – and the
process of remembering is intrinsically linked to the formation of identity and selfhood.
(Roy, 2009).
Therefore, remembering as a personal experience feeds into the building of
identities of the future as sectarian ones that get only one side of the story. There was a
need for such a memory studies intervention when one is giving a historical background
about Lebanon since as mentioned there are no facts in the Lebanese history, there are
merely documented events, personal narratives of stories, personal and political opinions.
All of the above functions as a tunnel in which one can have access to knowledge about
its history, that should never go unquestioned or taken for granted.
Within this activism around the conflictual nature of Lebanese history, an
initiative that aimed at archiving the Lebanese history was founded: the Memory At
Work project. What is significant about the memory at work project is that it does not
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assume that there is one narrative of history. And this is visible in its deployment of
archiving this history via various newspaper articles that were published during the civil
war. Thus documenting the daily political happenings during the war from various stand
points. Also, gets visible in the politics of naming the project – the name memory at work
does not assume memory as static facts that can be argued from one point of view.
Whether intended or not, the term Memory at Work does not assume memory as a single
narrative, but a more complex one that is at work and in flux, thus takes into
consideration perception, political stand points and personal experiences. The highlight of
such an initiative is important as a rupture in the way national memory is produced since
it avoids concealing certain information in order to form one narrative about the history
of the Lebanese civil war. After all the failure to produce one historical book that
archives the civil war might not be a problematic aspect, but hold the possibility of
rethinking the civil war as multi layered happenings and open possibilities of rethinking
civil war in order to not stagnate memories about it.
Lebanon at the current moment is unstable economically, politically and socially.
Between December 2013 and May 2014, 6 women were killed in domestic violence
disputes. For the past year, municipalities have been hanging banners that forbid any
“strangers,” read Syrian refugee, from moving after 6 pm at night in order to “protect”
the locals from what they define as robbery and rape. The latter is not only problematic
but is constraining freedom of mobility and an extreme xenophobic act of racism that
carries by itself an enormous amount of violence. The constant production of othering on
behalf of nationalism takes place on a daily basis, manifested in not only the othering of
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sects, but non-Lebanese citizens. Today, protests of labor unions are taking place almost
every week and so are explosions.
On the other hand, for two years now and by the heightening of the conflict and
civil war in Syria, Tripoli a city in the north of Lebanon on the borders with Syria has
been in conflict too. The mild efforts to tackle this conflict get outdated where every
other person in another area, except for a couple of leftist activists lost interest in Tripoli.
Blasts and explosions have been taking place for the past year in Beirut, Baalkbak,
Dahiye, Hermel, Saida and Tripoli covering almost seventy percent of Lebanon’s
territories as unsafe areas that are prone to explosions anytime.
This decline in governance made Lebanon as we know it today a place run by not
only the government but as well by non governmental organization that provide services
to people where the government failed. This yet reiterates the neoliberal nature of
Lebanon today, where the state has literally pulled out of the social, yet simultaneously
engaging in the social by surveillance, control and regulation. The Lebanese state in that
sense does not provide twenty four seven access to electricity to the public, neither water,
nor any other social service, but at the same time it’s surveillance of anything that in it’s
perception is outlaw such as people’s sexuality or any political act that it does not agree
with is highly punishable.

Conflict and Alliance
Through my engagement with Nasawiya, I have observed that while the self identified feminist collective conceives itself as highly political, women rights NGOs
mostly consider themselves to be non-political service providers. This non-political self-
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identification emerged after the civil war. Jad (2004, p. 7) argues that “The formation of
women’s NGOs with particular social aims marks a very different form and structures for
Arab women’s activism from those that predominated in earlier periods” In the Lebanese
case, this different form of structure can be traced through the shift from militancy of
women during the Lebanese civil war to the starting of the process of the NGO-ization of
the women movement in Lebanon. On the other hand, a political understanding that the
term non-political can be explained in various way, one of them hints that the NGO that
works on women rights is not affiliated in any way with the political parties that rule
Lebanon, thus hinting as well that it is not of a sectarian nature, in order to be inclusive to
everyone. The latter does not claim that sectarian cannot exist without a political party.
The political boundaries between both feminists and NGOs at times are very
tangible, and at other times are very vague. Even though feminists sometimes draw the
boundary by trying to dismantle the state as a patriarchal, sectarian entity thus refuse to
engage with it on some levels, the NGOs lobby against and with the state. But at the same
time the feminists in their alliances with NGOs such as the alliance of Nasawiya and
Kafa, both engage with state at some level through lobbying for the law against domestic
violence. Moreover, politics are mostly either a point of conflict or a point of alliance.
Even though this history of conflict and alliance is still constantly being produced, and
according one of my interlocutors: Razan, a feminist activist and scholar, Nasawiya and
since its founding, played a huge role in shifting the discourse around women rights
among women rights NGOs towards a more radical feminist agenda.
Here there’s a need to elucidate on the term radical agenda. Context needs to be
taken into consideration in such statements. Nasawiya as it’s name indicates is self
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evident, since it reflects the political stand that Nasawiya took, which is a feminist
political stand. The term Nasawiya now does only refer to the feminist collective, but as
well is used (was used before but not as frequently) as a translation to the term feminist.
Nasawiya was radical in that sense since it declared out and about in the public – in a
society that already perceived feminism as a negative act – itself as a feminist collective.
Moreover, Nasawiya for example in its ideological political stands took over not only the
case of women rights but as well publicly declared its support for the queer cause and sex
work. In comparison to the other NGOs that existed by the time Nasawiya was founded,
this political stand can be perceived as one that is radical.
The relationship that takes place among these various groups of feminist
collective and NGOs is complex. Yes sometimes they are in a political conflict, but also
other time they collaborate. Therefore here lies the complexity of what I try to entangle
through out this thesis: the power hierarchies, difference of political approaches and the
communication between women rights groups and the feminists. Not to mention how
women rights group have their own divide among themselves as well.
At the same time both Nasawiya and Kafa contributed over the past few years to
an intensified debate around the women’s question in Lebanon, they share in common the
language of human rights to discuss issues concerning women’s rights/ emancipation, and
both seemingly tether debates on freedom and equality to laws and regulations. One of
the multiple purposes of this thesis is to examine the women’s question in Lebanon over
the past five years and try to question more fully how hegemonic human rights language
has transformed the various segments of the Lebanese women’s movements into reform
movements working towards finding pre-determined solutions for the crisis of women’s

28

rights instead of working towards deconstructing dominant gender scripts of social
change and their implications on emancipation. Moreover I try to question the production
of the law as a fetish and an object of desire and understand how it is produced as such
and what factors intervene in this production.

The Cedar Revolution: The Unfolding of New Possibilities.
Following the 2005 Cedar revolution,2 and the lifting of civil society restrictions
(prior to 2005, for instance the right to protest was banned). In this research I give
Nasawiya as an example of how collectives that tackle the freedom story and justice post
the cedar revolution. Nasawiya is the product of the socio-economic and political context
of the history of Lebanon, of which the Cedar movement is part. For instance, the fact
that Rafic El-Hariri came as a businessman after the Civil War (1990s) to do all this
radical reconstruction of Lebanese urban architecture and Lebanese economy, and give
the image of "modern" Lebanon, allowed the proliferation of businesses that are willing
to compromise rigid "morals" for profit (bars, women NGOs etc..) and NGOs that speak
the language of rights (to give the image of modernity)..So it became possible for women
collectives such as Nasawiya to exist. The little sense of freedom does not only elaborate
on the possibility of such collective to emerge, but as well hints towards the need of such
collective to emerge. Also, in 2005 the fact that the Syrian army left Lebanon and people
became less paranoid about moukhabarat (the Syrian intelligence) (doesn't mean the

2

After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik El Hariri on February 14, 2005, and subsequent
protests against the Syrian regime’s interference and “colonial” practices in Lebanon, resulted in the
resignation of the pro-Syrian regime and the departure of the Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2005.
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moukhabart stopped existing, but people stopped being paranoid about it), and became
inspired about values of freedom, bravery and sacrifice due to the cedars revolution,
things became more visible, and there was less fear and more spaces that emerged within
that context and that historical moment.
In parallel to the process of NGOization of women movements in the Arab world,
Lebanon have witnessed a growth in NGOs work and an increase of NGO visibility,
grassroots feminist social movements and women NGOs. All of them since have played a
major role in intensifying the debates about women rights and gender equality. These
movements vary between grassroots feminist collectives based on progressive post
colonial, anti imperialist politics and institutionalized women rights NGOs that work on
lobbying for laws and providing services for women.
By saying services for women, a lot of questions arise, part of these question is
one that does not only interrogate what is a women but as well, and for the sake of
specificity what a Lebanese woman is. Here I find it essential to define or rather undefine what a Lebanese woman is, or who the Lebanese women are. Through-out my
interviews with Lebanese women and women who either have the Lebanese passport or
who have been raised in Lebanon despite of their nationality, I have noticed that the
category “Lebanese wom(e)n” barely exist. The different subjectvities of those wom(e)n
and the way they ontologically came to being challenges every hegemonic presumption
of any project that attempt to categorize these women as one. A Lebanese woman raised
in a Christian area, from a certain class and background may not have anything in
common with a Muslim women from another area. This difference might not be good or
bad, one is not better than the other as similarity is not assumed to produce equality.
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Therefore Lebanese women are not “one woman” as the song of the UN women says.
The Lebanese females are not one woman, if one of us cry that might not mean all of us
will. It is very challenging and beyond unfair to label, say for example, a woman from
Ras Beirut (still within the urban) to a woman from Karem El Zaytoun (another area in
urban Beirut). Ideologies, religion, sect, background, education, class, modes of gender
expression, views on things change from one place to another. Therefore it is a
reductionist approach to categorize all Lebanese women as women. They can be
Lebanese women but from somewhere, or from certain sect, or certain activist
background, or class, and had experienced some type of war in a different way at some
point in their lives. The multiplicity of the identities of Lebanese women needs to be
looked at in a feminist postcolonial lens in order to be understood. Lebanese women
cannot fit in one category as nationals of Lebanon, the plurality of their subjectivities
transcends national affiliation to religion, sect, class, race, ethnicity, color, geographical
location and sectarian affiliations which are at play in defining a Lebanese woman’s
subject position, thus challenging the hegemonic presumptions about women as a
homogeneous category. That said, it is important here to note that these differences
played a role in the access of different women from different sections in Lebanon to
participation in the civil war as fighters or supporters of fighters.
For example during the beginning of the civil war women of the phalangists party
joined the party as fighters that had their own weapons and units. Moreover women from
the Amal, and Hezeb Alla parties engaged with the fighters by being supporters and
helped the men in the traditional way (Shehadeh, 1999). On the other hand, women from
the left parties, were fighters as well, especially the militant women from the communist
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movement in the south and south Beirut. Moreover, and even though in a lot of books
Muslim women in specific were mostly documented as nurses and supporters of Hezeb
Alla and Amal movement, photos from the civil war contradicts these assumptions by
showing veiled women in specific with guns. This leads us again on these constant
contradictory narratives about the civil war in Lebanon and what gets visible via
knowledge production and what gets concealed.
Even though women were part of the freedom fighters party, which entails a lot of
loss of life; it is noticeable that the way in which they are remembered in historical sites
is stuck within the traditional heteronormative role of mother, sister, and nurse during the
war, even when they were militant. Moreover, the way the Lebanese state functions,
widens these differences among the women and institutionalizes these differences via the
personal status law that treats each group of women differently according to their religion
and sect. Therefore, a Christian woman is not only a Christian woman, she is either
maronite, catholic, orthodox, Armenian orthodox, evangelical and many other categories.
This applies to the Muslim women as well, she’s either Sunni or Shiaa and the latter have
categories of following certain rules under Sunni laws or Shiaa laws. Then there are the
Drouz, which are a minority around the world that exist in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria
only and have their own internal laws and beliefs. Even color sometimes plays a big role
in shaping womanhood.
On the other hand and on a global scale neoliberalism has intensified; the
neoliberal system reproduces people under capitalism

(Katz, 2005, p.624). The

neoliberal system produces people that intentionally or not perceive and deal with each
other as commodities. Therefore any type of subjectivity the neoliberal system produces
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is one that is oriented by capital and its relationship of power, which led to the expansion
of human rights discourse to influence movements. Amador Fernández-Savater argues
that neoliberalism exists in every detail of life where we experience life as a business.
The author adds that neoliberalism happens not only as an act of coercion but also
through daily life practices where people conceive themselves as a business and others
competitors. Moreover regardless of what we think of neoliberalism, whether we are
critical about it or not, it sustains itself since our opinion against it is abstract while it is
desired and we experience life through its feelings. Neoliberalism produces others as
obstacles instead of companions. (Savater, 2014). Therefore with this rise of
neoliberalism and in parallel with the rise of the global gender governance agenda that
deploys itself through the language of rights, women and feminist movements are
constantly being absorbed by the neoliberal system through various modes of
NGOization, access to funding that make out of them competitors to get funding money.
Moreover under constant trials of being tamed in order to absorb their militancy and
resilience against the various system of oppressions that suppress them.
The human rights discourse has expanded in scale becoming the only way in
which movements of resistance discuss emancipation. And women especially from the
global south became “one” entity. The recently acquired freedoms in Lebanese civil
society and its intersection with international human rights discourses produced new sets
of challenges. In order to be able to get at some of these issues, this thesis will revisit and
engage the complexity of the women’s question in the Lebanese state from 2008 to 2013.
This time frame is significant for an exploration of the articulations, strategies, and tactics
deployed by different movements under the concept of ‘resistance.’
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I am particularly interested in exploring local formulations and visions of what
constitutes resistance. Resistance does not always mean resistance against the system per
se. It can mean as well resistance among various sectarian groups against each other, or
among civil society groups – that on some level – tend to reproduce the same dynamics
of Lebanese political parties among themselves. Here, a contextualization of the language
of rights and its keywords as deployed and engaged in Lebanon becomes essential. For
instance, the vocabulary of human rights has gained much popularity in discussing
resistance. Yet, nothing exists without context. I understand context as the invisible
particle constituted from multiple particles that come together to form a concept or a term
that reflects a meaning, which eventually becomes consolidated as the grammar and
discourse of activism. This thesis will trace rights based discourses in the contemporary
Lebanese women’s movements in order to further our understanding of the possibilities
and limits that this imagination brings to gender-focused activism. I seek to explore how
rights-based language, and the projects and agendas that it structures, domesticates the
world of Lebanese feminist politics within gender governance frameworks. Furthermore,
I will trace the debates and processes within specific movements to get a fuller
understanding of ways in which distinct Lebanese women’s movements ended up
limiting their visions to “crisis prevention” in the post Cedar revolution years. I am
particularly interested in understanding how has this particular form of activism emerged
as a singular agenda uniting the “non-political” NGO service providers and groups
explicitly defining themselves as working outside the dominant system with explicit
visions

for

rupturing

“the

system”.

This thesis thus will attempt to push beyond the global circulation of terms and
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grammars, and immerse rights discourse as understood and deployed by different
movements in Lebanon through a geographical-historical lens.
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Chapter two
Who are the Un-touchables?
Introduction
Zizek (2010) argues that a true left is one that admits there’s a crisis and does not
fear crisis, but confronts it with no illusions. Illusions are embodied in the belief that the
rule of law will solve the social problems women are subjected to, and present the
solution as reform. Over an informal dinner with a friend who works with the UN, I
asked what do you think of the UN and the answer was “They ruin things so they can fix
them.” The statement reminded me of Harvey’s “Striking with one hand, healing with
the other.” A big chunk of my analysis in this thesis tries to reflect this point, how the
UN and through it’s gender governance managed to tame movements, but most
importantly how inequalities are vital for the UN’s existence and practices of control.
Here I would like to revisit my title, the UN-touchables. The UN-touchables symbolizes
the dogmatism surrounding the United Nations and its policies and behavior, especially
in the global south. But it is worthy to note that more and more recently when a
conversation is started with a co-activist about the UN, there’s a sense of dystopia
towards the UN that was not there a year ago. The hegemonic power of the UN with the
rise of crisis, wars and revolutions, especially over the last three years, whether in Syria,
Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Yemen or around most of the world, have opened the eyes on
the UN’s problematic existence. The UN-touchables might still be untouchables given the
human face of imperialism it still manages to wear, for the UN as perceived in this thesis
is an empire by itself that has a humanitarian face that gives the illusion that it exists to
help any type of minorities, while on the other hand, what it really does mostly, is come
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with an agenda to implement that serves to sustain the global powers as they are. At the
same time, something happened beyond only the personal experiences of people with the
UN, this thing I argue is critical knowledge production about it.
In Recovering Subversion, Menon (2004) questions the unending desire for laws in
contemporary women’s activism. Based on a genealogy of law and subjectivity in the
historical construction of the modern state, she argues that the language of rights and
citizenship has become problematic and in the historical present no longer works in favor
of emancipation. In a similar vein, Aradau (2008) explores ways in which the production
of women as victims leads to the depoliticization of the women’s question and turns it
into a crisis that needs to be solved through protection by human rights agencies and
states. Victims, so Aradau, require protection, which in turn produces the demand for
security. Securitization discourses, she argues constitute a tool for ordering and
regulating the social through more policing and rules. Therefore when women NGOs ask
for laws to "protect" women from family violence, women are portrayed as already
vulnerable and in need of protection which feeds into reproducing the same oppressive
narrative that takes agency away from women and expands notions of control for the sake
of protection.
Brown (2004, p.462) asks “whether the reduction of suffering promised by human
rights is the ‘most we can hope for’’ and argues that activists need to take into
consideration how human rights politics try to organize space in order to monopolize it
for other projects of power. Moreover, she questions the categorization of the ills of our
times, and questions if human rights discourse is enough to address these. Critique of
concepts and categories hence is essential for understanding our current moment in
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history. Even though, as Brown (2005) cautions, critique might not entail providing
solutions, critical theory is the thread that can get us towards a fuller understanding of the
constitution of the crisis itself. But then again, is that all that we can hope for? Given that
feminist critique of the empire has been vast field, this thesis aims towards highlighting
the importance of critique in pushing forward modes of thinking around these discursive
narratives, including how the shift in these modes of thinking have an epistemological
and mobilization value by itself. Likewise, Cornwall, Gideon and Wilson (2008) trace
the neoliberal influence on notions of emancipation, and the extensive gendering of the
heteronormative discourse of development. The question of women within neoliberalism
for the authors becomes a tool in order to integrate women in capital production for
surplus value. Similarly Bedford (2005) argues that development programs that seek to
‘empower’ women reproduce heteronormative roles between men and women or reverse
them, not attending to the power hierarchies that are not transgressed or confronted.
Development, so Bedford (2005) renders brown women victims of their ‘savage’ brown
male partners.
This thesis focuses on the expansion of human rights language in women’s
movements in Lebanon and seeks to trace the influence of neoliberal policies and the
language of human rights in relation to laws and regulations. It seeks to engage in a
conversation concerning questions of women’s emancipation and ways in which
articulations of resistance of self-identified feminist movements navigate hegemonic
discourses. Give the complexity of the social space in Lebanon, particular attention is
given to ways in which sectarianism, race, and class operate in the construction of the
category of the subject of Lebanese women, while simultaneously avoiding to reproduce
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Lebanese women as one.
In order to elaborate on what I mean by absorption of neoliberalism for women’s
movements and collectives, and how the links between human rights language and
practices are highly influential on the shaping of feminist collective practices, I would
like to draw on the example of the engagement of Nasawiya in the initiative “Take Back
the Parliament” that arose in the past two years. First and in order to form an
understanding of the links I would like to go back to the UN women website where they
elaborate on the importance of including women in the political life through voting and
running for elections, and including women in the army as peace keeping soldiers.
Women’s representation through quotas in parliaments have surfaced intensely for the
past couple of years and have become one of the causes that some women rights groups
hold and mobilize for. Part of the resolution about women participation in political life
focuses on the following argument:
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and
resolution of conflicts and in peace building and the need for
Member States and the United Nations system to increase
the role of women in decision-making with regard to
conflict prevention and resolution and the rebuilding of
post-conflict societies, in accordance with Security Council
resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 and its subsequent
follow-up resolutions, as well as other relevant United Nations
resolutions (United Nations, 2012).
The latter does not only essentialize women as peaceful, thus going back to the
women as mothers and natural peace keepers argument, docile bodies that are vulnerable
to war and outside the sphere of conflict in which war takes place. But the situation is
much more complex. This resolution specifically was used by the US government in
order to invade countries in the name of protecting women. Engaging women in the
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formal political sphere is one of the significant initiatives in the historical present. While
the UN is pushing towards engaging women in the formal political sphere, especially in
the global south and in the Arab world, Nasawiya’s ‘Take Back the Parliament’ (TBP)
initiative became an affirmation of the influence of the UN on the feminists movements,
rather than emerging out of the feminist collective.
TBP is an initiative designed by civil society activists, among them a few Nasawiya
members, who aimed towards taking back the parliament from the current political class,
and engaging women in the formal political life through providing alternative women
candidates to run for elections in 2013. Even though the initiative eventually fell apart,
my aim here is to highlight the link between the UN resolutions and its embodiment and
influence on the feminist collective.
After Nasawiya, and especially its leadership, started engaging with TBP and
holding intensive mobilization meetings for this project, and hence marginalizing other
ongoing projects within Nasawiya, a large number of its members resigned from the
feminist collective as a political statement that refuses to align with the sectarian system
in order to get to power. This new vision of Nasawiya, one that supported TBP brought
forth many questions and conflicts within the collective,

eventually leading to the

resignation of the core members of Nasawiya. The most prominent debate that emerged
was concerning the collective’s relationship to the state. The resignations were a
profound refusal to legitimize the Lebanese state’s existence in its current sectarian form,
which is one of the main sources of oppression of women and other marginalized
categories that members of Nasawiya have been working with since its inception.
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Conceptual Framework: A Conversation about Emancipation
Conversations concerning emancipation as a political project beyond the rights
language that this thesis engages in draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) assemblage
theory. Assemblage theory challenges reductionist analysis of social paradigms, unpacks
them on the basis of multiplicity, and traces their temporal and spatial contexts.
Assemblage theory will allow me to explore the Lebanese social and political contexts
due to its ability to connect dots of multiplicity that are linked to each other, where the
closer these concepts are to each other the wider the gap between them is rendered.
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 29) argue that “language stabilizes around a capital, it
forms a bulb.” Therefore there is no center for language, but many centers in which it
stabilizes and establishes itself around. Given this thesis attempt to understand more fully
institutions in Lebanon and the way they function and interact, their language of
oppression, history and its relation to the human rights language, drawing on this
framework provides the possibility to trace what happens when there is “no mother
tongue” but a more powerful language within a political multiplicity. It allows for a more
nuanced analysis of processes whereby the predominant language of rights gets translated
into multiple political geographical languages within a global hegemonic discourse.
This thesis relies on assemblage theory not only to envision the Lebanese feminist
political realm as a rhizome, but as a rounded rhizome globe with many knots that get
reproduced through cycles of connected discourses and contexts,
A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic
chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative
to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like
a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but
also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no
language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only
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a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.28).
This thesis traces these connections through an examination and exploration of
the women question in Lebanon not as one fixed fact frozen into an ahistorical frame, but
rather one that tries to understand where this language of mobilization comes from and
where does it go. I try to understand how mobilization for the law came into being and
what is at stake, and what is lost, in the constant lobbying for the law. How does the law
becomes a fetish in which it is desired. By exploring the relations between sectarianism,
class, gender and the desire for the law embodied in the human rights language, I attempt
to understand how a state produces difference thus complicating emancipation.
The rhizome-rounded globe will facilitate the exploration of how feminist
movements are connected to the rest of the world’s human rights language and politics.
Moreover explore the connection between the feminist discourse and tools of
mobilization and NGOs. The challenge lies in relating everyday lives of individuals,
communities, ideologies, happenings, activisms and ambitions to international human
rights politics without centering human rights language as the center of activism. But
what is a center is it outside or inside structure? Derrida argues that the center is outside
the structure because it is distanced from structure and has become decentralized.
Moreover, assemblage theory as a tool to understand the social as productive, given that
multiplicity can take different forms in Lebanon, for example, what constitutes
“Lebaneseness” can contradict with what constitutes a feminist; yet again these multiple
identities can be found in one person. This thesis does not take identities as a given static
identifications, but as a process of becoming. I am more interested in the formation of

42

subjectivities of how people meet, how subjects select sometimes to be political and to
transfer their politics and contesting ideologies to the political realm of feminist debate.
Consequently, understanding the rights language through the Lebanese feminist
movements and women’s rights NGOs entails understanding both of them, understanding
the actors in them, the individuals that put action and life into the work of politics. This
begs the question of what constitutes ‘Lebanese-ness’. This is a central question in this
thesis that tries to look at the production of ‘Lebanese-ness’ as a historical category that
‘functions’ in different ways in different sets of discourses. Lebanon is an identityproducing country where the multiplicity of each individual’s identity cannot be reduced
to a singular one, moreover it cannot be simplified without historical context and
analyses. This difference, as I argued before, and I continue to argue through out this
thesis is constantly produced as other in order to legitimize the existence of state as the
protector and the uniter of the nation. I examine how categories of distinction and
exception of ‘Lebanese-ness’ has been historically produced to front this discourse and
naturalizing the “problem of identity”. Lebanese people today have multiple layers of
identity: first they are born Lebanese provided they have a Lebanese father (Lebanese
women cannot pass on citizenship to their children if they marry a foreigner), then they
are further sorted by legal frameworks that further classify them by religion and sect.
Religion and sect, along with class, are essential components in the formation of
Lebanese subjectivity. Furthermore, Lebanese identity is highly gendered. Another layer
of identity is the families past and political affiliations with sect and militia movements
that dictate which political party and ‘side’ of the country they belong to.
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This multiplicity of components is essential to engage in conversations about
rights language since rights are defined according to each layer alone and to multiple
layers at the same time. I question how a hegemonic concept such as human rights where
equality for all is suggested as a solution for the ills of the world functions when it is
confronted with such a complex layer of local identities. The question here stretches
beyond identities to become an exploration of how these identitarian narratives are
produced and normalized and why, and how in turn this affects modes of resistance to or
collaboration with the hegemonic. Hall (2000) argues that identity is not stable; it is a
process that is not complete but materializes through a discourse, a process that is
constantly reproduced by elements around it.

Methodology & Fieldwork
The research for this thesis was conducted in Beirut where I did my fieldwork for
three months with two Lebanese women communities: Nasawiya and Kafa. I chose to
work with these groups for their ability to represent the range of categories that I am
interested in understanding more fully. Kafa, for example, has been working on passing
a law against domestic violence for over five years, while Nasawiya has aligned with
them in order to lobby for that law. My fieldwork with those two groups allowed me to
study how each of these groups view emancipation and through what languages they
maneuver the realm of Lebanese politics.
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This research tries to make sense out of what Law (2004) calls the mess of the
social. I interviewed members and former members of Nasawiya as well as independent
activists that are engaged in the feminist struggle. The analysis in this thesis are based on
personal encounters and formal interviews and side talks that took place through out the
years of my engagement in Nasawiya and all the social events and political mobilization I
was engaged in. I am, and was involved politically with the groups which I research at
various points. Hence I had easy access to the target members I wanted to interview. I
reflect through out this thesis as an individual within the collectives, as one that attended
meetings, protests, and various types of mobilization over six years. The open-ended
interviews include questions that first unpacked the complexity of the Lebanese selfidentified feminist subjectivities and those of NGOs women’s groups. The second phase
of fieldwork focused on tracing and critically engaging in a discussion about
emancipation with my interlocutors as individuals and political actors at the same time.
Having been part of the Lebanese feminist collective community, I find it challenging to
be critical of these collectives. Yet, this thesis aims to not only treat Nasawiya and Kafa
as subjects for this study, but also to provide a platform for pushing conversations and
debates further.
During my field work in Beirut in the three-month between December 2013 and
February 2014 I did not interview any of the Kafa board group members, or Nasawiya
leaders but people that volunteered in mobilizing for the passing for the law with Kafa
who were either independent activists that are not affiliated with any group, or present or
former Nasawiya members. Part of why I avoided interviewing leaders from both groups
I am working with is out of a methodology that is attentive to the power hierarchies that

45

get formed and give voice to certain people in leadership positions in knowledge
production. Usually interviews focus on the leaders of any group, for a variety of reasons,
one of them is that the leaders are always the visible people in collectives which mostly
results in reproducing in every research the same things said. A phenomenon that I tried
to avoid in my research, especially given my privilege of being part of the collective, thus
knowing the people in it and having easy access to interviewing its members away from
the leadership. I sought to produce an alternative discourse to the ones that over and over
“speak of the same things with the same people” as one of my interlocutors commented
while I interviewed her.

Chapter Outline
In the following chapters, I discuss the law, the influence of human rights
language on both the feminist collective and the women rights group. Moreover I try to
draw on the perception of the law, the fetishism and desire around the law. Finally I try to
provide the reader with an imagination of an emancipated Beirut through the imagination
of my interlocutors.
In chapter three I discuss CEDAW and the law, moreover I try to understand and
unpack the entanglement of the human rights language of CEDAW with the current
lobbying for the law by the feminist movement. In chapter two as well I question the law
as and its limitation as a strategy as a step in the process of women emancipation. Also, I
engage in a conversation and an analysis with the interlocutors I interviewed. I analyze
the contradiction in the desire for the law, and the knowledge that law alone is not
enough.
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In chapter four where I try to break down and understand what is the base of the
law fetish and how is this deep desire for the law is being produced through the
concealment of the power relationships that take place while producing this desire. How
is it that it becomes so desired and how does it complicate the project of a process of
emancipation.
In chapter five I draw a map of the imagination of my interlocutors and build on
this imagination in order to analyze and understand Lebanon. I engage in a conversation
with my interlocutors about imagination and emancipation, and the importance of
imagining beyond the structured system we live in, that produced the structural violence
and structural injustice we face everyday. Finally, I conclude that in order to engage in
the process of emancipation, the feminist collective or the feminist subjectivities that are
being constructed constantly need to pause on an individual and collective level and
reflect on the neoliberal mode of thinking and the production of the desire for the law and
get critical of it, in order for any present and future movement that is emerging to move
forward with the debate about emancipation.
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Chapter three
The (im) possibilities of the law as a strategy to end domestic violence against
women in Lebanon
Introduction
This chapter explores how and why the law as a tool of emancipation became a
mode of thinking for Lebanese feminist activists. I interrogate the tactics of human rights
institutions and their influence in solidifying state as the reference for rights and highlight
it’s problematic. Through my interlocutors I question the rule of law and engage in an
analysis of their opinions around the law as a strategy of emancipation. Consequently I
ask, what are the im(possibilities) of the law in the process of women emancipation.
In 2008 Kafa in alliance with Nasawiya began mobilizing the larger public in
support of a domestic violence law. At that time discussing domestic violence was a
taboo. Encounters spoke of discomfort and surprise on the part of people to raise these
issues in public. Given years of work by 2014 Kafa managed to not only agitate for legal
reform by pressuring the government to address domestic violence, but most significantly
it succeeded in making domestic violence visible as a social problem.
Since 2008 the alliance has been active with advertising campaigns, protests, and
talking to women in the streets concerning domestic violence on international women’s
day in various cities in North and South Lebanon in addition to Beirut. Due to the efforts
of the alliance reporting of domestic violence has significantly increased since 2008.

Thawra Nasawiyi (Feminist Revolution).
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The labor of the alliance was divided between the two main organizations. Kafa,
due to its relationships with the government and members of parliament focused on
lobbying and formal advertising in support of domestic violence legislation, while
Nasawiya, concentrated on mobilization, organizing protests and sit ins. Mobilization in
support of domestic violence legislation also included publishing in newspapers and
feminist journals such as Sawt Al Niswa,

3

appearing on talk shows on national and

international television, and establishing a presence in social media.
Domestic violence legislation has been fraught with tensions on the level of the
state. Drafted in year 2007, the draft law was submitted to a committee for further
deliberation. Prime ministers Samir El Jesser, Imad Al Hout, Ali Ammar, Michael El
Helou, Ghassan Moukhayber, Gilber Zwein and Chant Jenjenian were the members of
this committee. They represent most of the sectarian parties in Lebanon. Nizar Saghie, a
lawyer well known for his support of controversial issues, commented as follows:
Opposition to the law, with its latest version amended
to include protection of other family members, is
especially strong among communities of Lebanon’s
Muslim sects. The latter perceive the law as a fundamental
threat to the family, a contravention of Sharia principles,
and an impending danger to the prerogatives of religious
courts. Similar fears were expressed about the consequences
of the measures applied under the law for the protection of
children at risk.The original PWDV draft law was proposed
by the Lebanese NGO, KAFA (Enough), as a means
to protect women in particular. However, it underwent
several amendments as it moved through government
legislative channels. Amending the proposal was a means to
address the concerns of opponents and soften their stance.
Significant amendments by the special parliamentary sub-committee,
for example, took place right after several Islamic associations
intensified their pressure against passing such a law.
3

Sawt Al Niswa is a feminist zine founded by a Nasawiya member and published under the Nasawiya umbrella.
Currently became an independent initiative due to political conflicts among the founders and Nasawiya.
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Under the guise of upholding the principle of equality
regarding the protection of all family members -not just
women- against acts of violence, the sub-committee willfully
altered the law in such a way as to redefine these acts. Punitive
provisions aimed at acts most characteristic of males’ traditional
authoritarianism, such as marital rape or female forced marriage,
were taken out of the draft. Acts unrelated in principle to
violence, such as adultery and prostitution, were
included
as
acts
of
violence.”
(Saghie,

2013).

According to Saghie, the strength of the domestic violence law was watered down
by shifting its target from protecting women from domestic violence to the family.
Moreover issues such as marital rape were excluded due to the influence of the religious
establishment on the committee. Even though Saghie focuses on Muslim clerics in
particular, it should be noted that Christian clerics did not take a stand in support of
marital rape, thus contributing subtly to its exclusion.
While the religious establishment was not formally part of the committee, they
nonetheless wield tremendous influence over legislation in Lebanon. The use and control
of women’s bodies by the religious establishment is not limited to the domestic violence
law but constitutes a de facto regulatory body that interferes directly in women’s lives,
their sexuality, abortion rights by privileging the family as a unit and hence maintain the
particular social power of the Lebanese state.
The challenges to the domestic violence law took place the minute the draft was
submitted to the committee. Struggles over the content of the law, especially the
exclusion of the marital rape clause, on January 14, 2012. Members of Nasawiya were
actively involved in mobilizing for the January 14 protest by appearing in talk shows and
on radio programs to discuss reasons for the protest. They also began a spontaneous
campaign of writing “fight rape, January 2014” on the mirrors of every bathroom,
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restaurants, bars, coffee shops and shopping malls they went to. Graffiti was another tool
to promote awareness, such as 7areb el eghtisab (fight rape), anonymous activists
designed a graffiti stencil that portrayed the Sunni mufti Qabani saying maa el eghtisab
(support rape) that was sprayed on walls in Beirut.
The night before the protest a group of feminist friends came together to prepare
banners and write down the chants to lead the protest. The chants varied between ya neib
‘oul el haq btehmy el mejrem walla la’ (MP say the truth are you protecting the criminal
or not) and lal horiyi lal horiyi, thawra thawra nasawiyi (achieving freedom entails a
feminist revolution).
The week before the protest was a very intense one, the collective or at least the
feminist comrades I was around were full of hope and excitement. There was a sense that
this was a historical opportunity to push questions of rape and marital rape into public
discourse. While only 600 people participated in the ‘Fight Rape’ demonstration, it was a
huge shift for the feminist movement in Lebanon, since the first feminist protest of such
nature that took place in 2008 barely had fifty people that attended it. ‘Fight Rape’ did
not only shed the light on marital rape itself, but it broke taboos around the issue of rape
itself. Hundreds of activists across a wide political spectrum marched together to object
to the elision of rape in the proposed law. The most striking banners held in the protest
was one that said “if someone raped your mother, would you call him daddy?”.
In 2013 another protest to pressure the government into passing the domestic
violence law took place in Beirut, whereby women rights groups, and especially women
rights groups of Lebanese political parties joined the protest. It did came as a surprise this
burst out into protesting from women from the political parties, previously they would
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provide symbolic support by sending one representative on the behalf of their party. This
time, they came in bigger numbers carrying their party flags and advertising their parties.
This incident of being visible in women’s rights protests might be part of their on going
political campaigns to advertise for themselves and collect political supporters. It is
however significant that 2013 in specific was the year that the UN declared as the year to
fight violence against women. Thus suddenly women rights groups from political parties,
who have members of the committee belonging to the same party in the parliament
distorting the domestic violence law, were in the streets protesting against domestic
violence where they still supported their parties. The latter sparked a lot of controversy in
the debate among feminists themselves and to my knowledge this debate escalated the
tensions among the group. For example, one of the organizers of the protest burst out in
tears as she saw how the women rights group of the Future Party took the opportunity of
the media existence in order to bring up what is referred to as Al Shahid (the martyr Rafiq
Harriri). The Future Party, a Sunni Party headed by the Harriri family, played a
prominent role in mobilizing for the Cedar Revolution after the assassination of Rafiq
Harriri. The same family owns the Solider company, responsible for the controversial
reconstruction of Beirut after the civil war. The Future Party, furthermore, was among the
actors imposing the Sunni Mufti’s agenda in opposing marital rape to be included in the
deliberations of the committee studying the domestic violence law. Hence, the
participation of the political parties in the demonstration raised uncomfortable and tense
issues regrading the imbrication of capitalism, neoliberalism and the direction that the
debates of the domestic violence law was taking.
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The tensions within Nasawiya itself, and among the women rights groups, though
stood in stark contrast to the death of four women in those two weeks due to domestic
violence in Lebanon. Due to the intensity of violence and domestic violence crimes
reported in 2014, on the 8th of March 2014 (one month away from writing this chapter)
according to Kafa’s announcement on their facebook page, the women in Lebanon will
take the streets in order to pressure the government for a legislative session in order to
pass the law against domestic violence. The upcoming protest is supposed to happen
under the slogan “If it takes the street for legislation, then we are coming.” As I wrote
this thesis the protest did happen. IWD 2014 witnessed one of the biggest protests in the
history of Lebanese women’s mobilization following the civil war. Thousands of people
took to the street in order to ask Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament
since 1992 (and the head of the Amal movement), to put together a parliamentary
meeting in order to pass the law against domestic violence without any distortions. I
would like to draw on the problematic position of asking political figures such as Nabih
Berri to sympathize with, and take up the killing of women as a result of domestic
violence, as an urgent matter for legislative intervention. Nabih Berri, along with most of
the parliament members, including Micheal Aoun (head of the Free Patriotic Movement),
Samir Jaajaa (head of the Lebanese Forces Party) and many others, were important actors
perpetuating the civil war. They took part in crimes against humanity in the war’s
sectarian violence and massacres of Lebanese and Palestinian communities. Given that
today these figures make up a significant part of the Lebanese government, for the
feminist community there can not but be a moment of irony asking them to feel sympathy
for the death of women in Lebanon, and legitimizing their rule by requesting that they
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legislate on behalf of woman to begin with. This raises multiple questions about the
limitation of law as a strategy to achieve justice for women and people within the
Lebanese context. Therefore in this chapter I engage with my interlocutors in a
conversation about the law, and question its limitations and possibilities as a tool of
emancipation.
Over the past seven years many changes have taken place in the structure of
feminist collectives, many groups were formed, and many others fell apart. One thing
did not change though, the ongoing political debate, and the ongoing violence and its
intensity, which raises questions regarding the efficacy of the strategies and tactics
adopted. Hence it is necessary to reflect on the past and the present, the disfunction and
incapability of the law to grant women equality.
The law being a language of rights might now be one of the biggest problems,
language is an ongoing process of dialogue that is in constant change. The law as a
process of legislating and granting power to government to practice control over people
living in Lebanon I argue is a core problem. The law against domestic violence in the
Lebanese feminist collective jumped beyond being a language and molded itself into a
form of terrain of thinking. Harvery (2007) argues “Neoliberalism has, in short, became
hegemonic as a mode of discourse and has pervasive effect on ways of thought and
political-economic practices to the point where it has been incorporated into
commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world”. The dangers of
neoliberal discourses infiltrating ethics and ideologies is that they have become common
sensical and repetitive to the extent that one starts to adopt them with no sense of
reflection or critique. Moreover, even when there is a sense of critique and a sharp gaze at
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how power functions, the immediacy of the crisis demands action: women are dying now.
The problem here cannot only be limited to a neoliberal analysis of the crisis, the problem
is deeper and more much complex, the problem of justice in itself.
Besides the fact that, as I argued above, the capitalist, sectarian, patriarchal,
neoliberal, social and economical systems in Lebanon produce fertile grounds for
violence against women, the concept of justice is always already problematic. It raises
the question, when does justice takes place? Justice supposedly takes place after injustice
happens. Therefore the perception of the concept of justice within the frame of the law
assumes that injustice should happen for justice to take place. Therefore the framework of
the law, even though proven along the years that it does not, and will not stop violence
from happening, up until today gives the illusion that the law will stop the perpetrator
from violating the violated. Law works after violence occurs, it does not address the
basis out of which violence emerges. Hence, we remain stuck in a vicious cycle of
reproduction of violence.
I have attempted to present a brief historical background about the Domestic
Violence Law, it goes without saying, that these brief pages do not give justice to all the
efforts and mobilization and political shifts that happened in these years. A detailed
historical narration of movements though is not within the scope of this research.

Why not CEDAW?
With the global emergence of the language that lobbies for equality among men and
women, turning every discussion about human life and quality into rights discourses via
global governance bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the Committee on the
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Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) emerged to become the basic
text along which equality among genders is navigated and evaluated. Irrespective of how
CEDAW came to be, and with respect to the activist that brought it to fruition, feminist
legal theorists have highlighted the problems of CEDAW itself and its working
mechanisms. Moreover it may be noted that although
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins
by asserting "the inherent dignity" and "the equal”
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,”
it turns immediately to the state. In doing so it underlines the
fact that the universal character of the rights bearing
person is made the responsibility of sovereign states, each of
which has jurisdiction over a limited group within the
human family (Assad, 2007, p.6).
As Assad argues human rights cannot be disentangled from the state’s power and it’s
process of practicing it’s power on people. Human rights while turning to the state tend to
reproduce a cycle of oppression since a state, such as Lebanon for example, is one that is
produces differences as othering in order to reign. As I noted in the previous chapter
regarding Lebanon, a state with a criminal history of civil war and a neoliberal one par
excellence.
Merry (2003, p. 943) argues, “CEDAW is law without sanctions.” She contends
that CEDAW depends on dynamics of shaming and blaming. Shaming and blaming,
though efficient depending on context, takes us back to questioning how international
human rights treaties work. If a law without economical or military sanctions can
influence nations than there is a certain power hierarchy deployed in the dynamics
between the UN, and the world. There’s a need to recognize here that UN treaties have
been used before in order to impose sanctions on countries for ‘human rights’ violations;
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not to mention the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in order to save the woman for
‘peace keeping’ purposes. The latter is not an exception but a tool of how the UN
functions, in the words of Harvey, as the left hand of the empire. The empire is the new
order in which the world functions according to Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri (2000). It
is the new political order of globalization where the power center is deteritoralized and
dispersed in various centers of powers that makes it possible to view them tangibly and
taking a hold of them. The UN makes possible the maintenance of the new power order
of the world via the bodies and legislations of the UN. At the same time, sanctions on
countries are only moral. Countries who are working against human rights are
symbolically criticized and problematized by the international community.
I contend here that pressuring governments via shaming and blaming makes visible
the power of the UN institutions, and give an intangible value to laws that are perceived
as ‘progressive’ for women. These laws such as CEDAW have become the measure by
which the world measures modernity of nation states and their ability to apply justice.
Whereby justice becomes a tool in which subjects of powers are domesticated. Therefore
states with ‘progressive’ legislations (such as ones that signed and applied CEDAW in
it’s local laws) are perceived to be modern in contrast to the states that either did not sign
such treaties or signed them with reservations that make them dysfunctional. The
definition of a country as modern provides it with lot of privileges, in which certain
countries are realized as leaders of the world today, and others as backward and
underdeveloped, thus liable to be colonized. In this sense what they actually accomplish
is another tool for regulation and global governance via gender governance; rather than
equality or emancipation, especially since the terms of reference or the standard against
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which things are measured is so out of synchronization with what happens and how life is
structured in other parts of the ‘global south.’
If it is assumed that treaties such as CEDAW are efficient in providing a better
quality of life for women especially under the umbrella of the law, Harding (2008, p. 1)
argues that western modernity is extremely distant from the interest, needs and desire of
both men and women who are its products, questioning how western modernity can be
possible for non-western people under such circumstances. Merry (2003, p. 945) reminds
us that even countries that have passed CEDAW and applied them still struggle with
domestic violence. Even countries in the West that are perceived as modern nations, so
Merry, have failed to set the tools in which the process of emancipation of women is
possible. But what is equality, what is freedom in a world governed by big institutions
and run on the imagination and desire for modernity? Taylor (Taylor, 2002, p.92) reflects
these questions as follows:
The central to Western modernity is a new conception of the
moral order of society. At first this moral order was just an
idea in the minds of some influential thinkers, but later it
came to shape the social imaginary of large strata, and
then eventually whole societies. It has now become so
self-evident to us; we have trouble seeing it as one
possible conception among others. The mutation of this
view of moral order into our social imaginary is the
development of certain social forms that characterize
Western modernity: the market economy, the public sphere,
the self-governing people, among others.
Therefore rights and the desire of equality became curbed by morals that are
institutionalized via western modernity in our every day. It became unquestionable as
Taylor argues, with barely any critical gaze as to how it sustains the circulation of capital
in open markets that by itself creates the gaps, economical gaps, racism and sexism and
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violence against women and everybody else. The latter are the grounds on which these
inequalities have the possibility to be produced.
One of the major problems with global legislation such as CEDAW is that it
permits reservations based on arguments regarding culture and tradition. Arguments
concerning reservations hold that culture is a static body instead of an ever-changing
process of becoming. It is worthwhile mentioning that law making, policies and treaties
are in a nutshell based on a body of generalization of issues inflicted by power on human
beings. Penny (2010, p. 87) argues that “Policy making assumes that women and men are
fixed, binary and essentially differently located necessarily has the capacity to improve
their well-being.” Governance views the world in a binary of genders as men and women,
thus other genders, class, race, geographical location, color, ideologies and so on – which
are part of human subjectivity constructions – get marginalized. The latter puts both
genders in a fixed position thus crippling any discussion for those who use the human
right treaties beyond the binary of men and women. Consolidating categories facilitates
the process of control over people that neoliberal states aspire to. By categorizing people
into genders, it is easier to regulate them. One cannot regulate the uncategorized, the
unstructured since it does not have a center into which it can be boxed and ruled.
Therefore, human right treaties by failing to address more than one category – or by
failing to de-categorize - tend to reproduce the same cycle of subordination of women by
dealing with categories as if they exist outside of the structures and dynamics of power
that produces them. The failure of achieving a more inclusive, less categorical approach
that includes analysis of capitalism and racism within gender and sectarianism
institutionalizes discrimination via the state. It empties violence from its content, where

59

violence becomes perceived as the problem rather than a symptom of the dysfunctional
system of othering in which difference is produced. Focusing solely on violence against
women and providing solutions to it in laws renders mobilization for equality focuses on
one aspect of the problem while the roots of the problems beyond the biological body get
ignored and rendered invisible. The latter is dangerous because it endangers the
mobilization against violence into falling in a cycle of dealing with issues superficially.
Race, class, temporality, geographical location, color, privilege and other aspects have to
be taken into consideration in analyzing any social problem.
The identity category based approach of the CEDAW and the UN in general
empties those categories out of their contents and context, as well as structures under
which they are produced and deem them pure victims not attending to the biosocial,
economical and racial content they have inside them.

Problematizing Gendered Categories
The crippling effect of creating categories in which the rights language functions,
acts on multiple levels of plurality. Brown for example argues
Liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized
private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into
normativized social identity manageable by regulatory
regimes. Thus disciplinary power politically neutralizes
entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas
liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by
disciplinary identities. (Brown, 1993, p.394).
Mobilization around gender based identities and categories essentialize these categories.
It makes it easier for the state apparatus to police these categories and discipline them.
The category of women, for example, carries within it multiple categories. One of the
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categories is the victim category that is needed the most for purposes of legislating and
simultaneous depoliticizing of the political fight against violence. The politics of naming
and giving meaning is one that is mostly created in the field of the political (Bourdieu,
1985, p. 730). The act of providing meaning to something becomes the act of attributing a
sense of value attached to it. The act of triggering a sense of realization of something
attached to the word. A victim category depoliticized is a victim crippled and frozen
outside of space and time, with no sense of moving forward or even backward. Moreover
a victim erases everything else but victimhood. The way in which victimhood is being
dealt with within human rights discourses disregards all the social, political and economic
situations that allows violence to happen and concentrates only on the victim as if
victimhood is timeless. A victim is a word linked to pity, helping and saving. Saving,
mostly is the act of feeling better about one’s self without attending to the power relations
that come into play by someone having certain set of privilege, that entitle them to help
another person, disregarding how these structures and hierarchies of power pass
unnoticed.
I could never relate to the victim category; as a matter of
fact I found it oppressive in its own way. The essentialization
of being an Arab woman and the exceptionalism that it includes
make violence looks like it only happens to Arab
women - like it doesn’t happen outside in Europe or
example. (Layla, December 2013).
Layla is a feminist activist and former Nasawiya member who quit the collective
due to political clashes based on her own perception of feminist politics. Layla was a
prominent figure that had a working position that gave her access to attending many
international conferences for women rights. She always expressed her discomfort with
the discourse of reproducing Arab women as victims in international human rights
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meetings. That issue resurfaced in my interview with her. She views this victim category
production as a pre-produced discursive narrative that repeats itself in a constant pattern.
This pattern is mostly plotted in a way that pleases the presumed stereotype about ‘Arab’
women as equally oppressed to a predominantly white audience. This narrative, as Layla
discusses, is oppressive by itself. The position of victim, with the weak docile body that
gets inflicted on people from the ‘Arab’ world for example, and Lebanon in specific,
assumes that regardless of who you are, you are a victim of violence and thus
depoliticizes the voice of these women and throws them in a cage of empathy from a
western audience, not to mention Arab audiences. In her take on “Do Muslim women
really need saving?” Lila Abu Lughod (2002, p.784) argues that
Instead of questions that might lead to the exploration
of global interconnections, we were offered ones that
worked to artificially divide the world into separate
spheres recreating an imaginative geography of West
versus East, us versus Muslims.
The western need to victimize Arab women leaves no space for any critique for the west
itself. The production of discourses of victims constitutes one set of problems, the
production of local victims mapped across the global south constitutes another set of
problems. Local victim production cannot be separated from the global victim
production. When the word victim is mentioned, it comes from a background of
witnessing various human rights campaigns against violence against women. For
example, one NGO logo features a violated women with a tear running down her face,
this same NGO relies on a discourse of women as mothers to evoke empathy. Other
campaigns invite men to man up and not beat women but ‘protect’ them. The victim
production narrative relies on the same bodies of gender governance that make use of
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creating it. While the west produces Arab Muslim women as victims in order to invade
countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, they simultaneously support UN treaties focused
on protecting women from war and violence. These same bodies that allow the use of
treaties of human rights to breach human rights by invading countries and propagating
wars – are the same forces that mostly fund local NGOs and movements that work on
women rights issues. Therefore the cycle cannot be completed without the
local/international victim production. It is virtually impossible for local NGOs to receive
funding from international governance bodies without either empowering women or
saving women from some kind of violence as consequences of it ‘culture’ or ‘religion.’
Victims are produced globally and locally simultaneously, local victims are the alibi for
the west to highlight its modern face and second to produce the global victims based on
statistics and numbers produced locally.

The stakes in the politics of compromise
Sara a former Nasawiya member and a feminist activist states that
There are a lot of compromises that need to be made if you
want a law to pass in order to protect women from domestic
violence. For example if you want to change the
discourse against domestic violence, you have to
victimize the woman. There is no escaping it (Sara, January 2014).
The use of the notion of compromise raises questions with regards to the way Sara views
laws and the victim category. Compromise is when the feminist movement for example
accepts (even when it is critical of) the fact that women need to be produced as victims in
order for them to be able to mobilize for a law that protects them from violence. The
victim category has been historically a challenge for various types of feminists to break
out from, given that being identified as a victim simultaneously puts a woman in a
vulnerability position thus reproducing over and over the inherent narrative that women
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are vulnerable therefore they need to be protected. Protection by itself is problematic
since protecting someone entails sometimes practicing certain types of power over her.
Therefore it is important to question, what is the politics of compromise and how does it
get deployed in the context of the law against domestic violence in Lebanon?
It is worth mentioning here that throughout all the years of my involvement in the
feminist movement and through my interaction with women rights groups and NGOs,
there was a deep sense of disillusionment with the law itself as the ultimate magic
solution that will change the situation by itself. All the women I interviewed from various
backgrounds, sects, ideologies, religion, geographical location, educational background,
race, gender, and orientation, stressed that the law is the first step towards the process of
emancipation but not the only step. There was an ongoing realization that laws will not
change the way in which society deals with women bodies especially in matters of
violence against women. But at the same time, a small portion of women that were
interviewed disregarded the idea that the law as a solution at all in the first place. Those
women in specific – the ones who did not believe passing a law will change anything –
hinted towards the need for a more broader inclusive politics in dealing with violence
against women and other matters. Manal a feminist activist and a student argues,
If you apply one law to everyone, what if it doesnʼt work
on all of them? Law is a document that is written in
some paragraph, or book, but it will never be able
to cover all the situations that could happen. That makes
it impossible for any law to be free of discrimination.
(Manal, December 2013).
Manal’s argument about the law realizes that after all it is a document, and even though it
is simply a document that is written, it has the power of legislation. It states that yes, the
law gets applied sometimes, and does not get applied at other times, but mostly it is one
document that is responsible for the lives of millions of people. The law is a document
that includes certain power relations that embodies regulation and order. Thus, law
organizes the lives of millions of women from all type of classes, backgrounds, sects, it
deals with their differences as a means to segregate and hierarchize, rather than viewing
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this difference as inevitable within multiplicity. The law is a bundle of relationships and
power, open to interpretations all the time even in the moment in which it is enforced; it
is a reflection of the social relations that are there, and hence there’s a need to deal with
the social that produces the law. The ‘law’ is embodied already within how movements
imagine emancipation. The law cannot give justice to every woman equally, not to
mention that the people that are drafting these laws and applying them are after all human
being that are from certain backgrounds and ideologies themselves.
A second interlocutor who thinks of the law as a failed strategy to emancipate
women is Noha. Noha is not comfortable with either the term feminist or activist as labels
that were distorted by the practices of some feminist activists as she describes. These
feminist activists according to her identify as activists and feminists yet again use their
privileges in order to oppress other people, gain leadership momentum and abuse the
crisis around inequality in order to make money through funding. Noha’s sense of refusal
to identify with these labels come from long years of engagement in the feminist
collective and civil society. When I asked Noha if she believes in the law as a tool to
bring equality to the daily lives of women, the conversation went as such
Maya: Do you believe that the law against domestic
violence is a good strategy of feminist politics?
Noha: No, is it important to see things from different
perspective. Do I believe that the law against domestic
violence would emancipate women? No. But for example
if you want to work with the law, it is important to work
on lobbying to allow women to pass their Lebanese
nationality to their kids and husbands. Law works on
different issues in different strategies. As for the domestic
violence law, To give the option to for women for example
to report to the police that she was beaten up, ok, maybe
her husband will let her go because of this, and
tell her if you want a divorce take it. The question is beyond
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this only. The question is what happens to her in the
family and on the social level. I come from a
very violent family background; I know how violence
feels and how it take place. That why my problem
with feminists is that they speak of violence as if they are
separated from it. What would the law to protect women
from family violence do to for example women as my mother?
Provide her with protection in a shelter house? What does
it mean for a woman to move from having autonomy over
her own house to a shelter house, is that the maximum
we aspire for? Either staying at home while being
beaten up by your husband or put you in a shelter house?
While we throw your husband in prison or a rehabilitation
center?”.
Noha reflected on a vision that she has towards the social that transcends the social
imagination that takes the law as a legislative body that gives justice to people. Her
experience with violence made it visible for her that the strategies Kafa are taking to
provide women with a life outside their abusive house fail to capture a bigger wider
social problem. Providing safe houses for women does not work according to Noha. She
perceives the problem of domestic violence as one that cannot be simply solved through
reporting it the police, divorce, jailing the husband or the father, moreover providing
women with shelter houses to escape domestic violence. This statement hints that there’s
a bigger problem to domestic violence that is much deeper than providing solutions of
escape or imprisonment of the husband. She also stressed that most of the feminists who
lobby against domestic violence treat it as if they are distant from it, as if they are outside
it. Thus putting them in a position of privilege that forms hierarchies of power against
those who experience violence up close and personal. Moreover reproducing out of those
whom experienced domestic violence at their homes as victims. Reproducing violence as
an exception away from their lives where violence is entrenched in everyday life details.
According to Brad Evans (2013/2014, p.3) “Violence is never is problem to be studied in
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some objective or neutral fashion.” Therefore by the feminists distancing themselves
from the domestic violence and trying to take an objective stand towards it strips it out of
its complexity, thus makes it possible for it to become a problem that can be solved by
criminalizing it. Consequently, and regardless of how much one tries to define violence,
violence stays as a very complex process that takes place according to various contexts.
“Violence is a complex phenomenon that defies neat description. It cannot be reduced to
simple explanations, for as many of its victims tell, there is no totalizing truth about
violence. Nor can the experience of violence be universalized or merely thought of in
terms of some institutional breakdown or failure of State”(Evans, 2013/2014, p.2).
Therefore this thesis views violence as one that cannot, as Evans states, be neatly defined
or reduced to simple explanations that definitions usually reduce violence to. The most
important aspect about violence that this research tries to understand is how the
mobilization against domestic violence is one form of the absorption of resistance of the
feminist collective into modes of resistance that dissolves their mobilization into
reproducing the same conditions that creates this violence.
Jihan, a leftist activist, makes another point about the contradictory disfunctionality
of the law but at the same time the need for it. Jihan analyzes and discusses laws from a
lawyer’s perspective:
The sociology of law putting aside sect, religion
and Beirut, states that it is made in a way that it does not
get applied to human beings equally. As a lawyer,
working in law firms and getting in contact with
how laws get applied ruined all the stuff we learned in
school about the law. Yes the law is a tool in the hands
of state so it can oppress/organize the lives of people by
claiming to protect them. But at the same time and even
though I am disillusioned passing this law by itself is a
rupture in the system. The same system that states bluntly
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that domestic violence does not exist. The same system that
discriminates between men and women, allowing men to
practice violence against women. It is to be acknowledged
that the law by itself does not change anything on its own,
Rosa Luxemburg for example when talking about
revolutionary acts takes into consideration that the
accumulation of forms of rupturing the system such as
reform can be efficient. Therefore I cannot take a biased
stand between reform through the law and mobilizing for
social change against discrimination. (Jihan, January 2014).
If the sociology of law by itself states that the law is not made to be applied to all human
beings equally, how about the domestic law against violence law that is discussed in this
thesis given that the first target and beneficiary of the law against domestic violence are
supposedly women. Women who are already in a state that discriminates against them
based on various reasons it produces. There are a lot of contradictions in the way Jihan
views the law. Even though as she stated she is a lawyer and her experience with the law
disillusioned her of its efficiency in providing equality to all people (which is what law
claims to do) she still believes that the law is useful in providing justice. Jihan, like other
feminists interviewed in this thesis, were at some point active in participating in the
protests to ask for the passing of the domestic law. Others have mobilized for years for
protest whether fight rape, or against sexual harassment protests, or simple protest on
international women’s day.
The ability of the law to provide justice according to Jihan, is not derived by the
law as a egalitarian entity by itself, but functions as a tool in order to form a rupture in the
body of the discriminatory system that does not admit that domestic violence is practiced
against women. In addition when domestic violence or any other type of violence is
practiced against women, the woman herself is mostly blamed for the violence by
questioning how she ‘deserved’ that violence from her husband. Question such as “what
did you do to anger your husband so he hit you” by the police or society are often asked
to women when they try to discuss domestic violence. Questioning what was a woman
wearing when she got raped, why was she out at night that late and what was she doing in
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the streets are familiar questions that a lot of women hear when they talk about their
experiences with the police in specific. Here, the protests themselves outside the
dichotomy of whether to support the law or not become a mere opposition to acts of all
types of violence against women. Moreover it is an act of objection and reclaiming of
public spaces. An act of affirming and reiterating that existence in the public sphere by
women is a fact, and that women are not going anywhere, especially not back to the
private sphere, where supposedly they belong. The private sphere though extended to
work, where work becomes a counter public that is perceived as partially private, women
continue to be mostly not welcomed in the streets.
Another feminist and civil society activist in Beirut Nour discredited the law
completely by saying, “The law is only a tool in the hand of state in order to curb the
feminist movement into the system.” (Nour, December 2013). Nour objected heavily to
the ability of the law in granting women any type of equality. Her radical views
discredited the law completely based on the way it emerges via certain power dynamics
and privileges. Nour argues that men draft the laws, and not all of them are ready to give
up their privilege. Building on Nour’s statement, it is obvious that laws can be viewed as
tools in the hands of the state used to derive legitimacy of it’s existence even from
feminist movements. If women need protection then the state should exist in order to
protect them, otherwise and if we apply the same thought to all human life everyday, if
there are no problems and danger, would there be a need for the state to organize?
Therefore laws do not only curb feminist movements into the system, are unjust to
different groups of people, discriminate against women, but they also legitimize the
existence of the state itself. Therefore as long as there are laws and somebody lobbying
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for laws, there will always be a state regardless whether it passes the law or not.
Assuming that states need legitimacy to continue the process of protection and
organization of society that created them, it does not come as a surprise that states do not
work in favor of providing equality for all. That is because its existence is directly linked
to the sustainable crisis of the social. The state’s existence rely on problems it can solve
in order for it to justify it’s surveillance and authority. Again if there were no social
problems, then state has no reason to exist. Of course states are a part of historical
process that emerged within a certain capitalist moment of history. Taking these ideas
back to the feminist collective, especially the one in Lebanon that realizes the failure of
the state of the law, the question can then be asked here: Why are there contradictory
statements about the law? Did the law become a terrain of thought that cannot be
disentangled from achieving justice? As Laya put it, “I think laws are maybe one quarter
of the battle I think maybe they are an important element, but they are definitely not
everything. If not through the system then what is the alternative?”. (Layla, December
2013).
The most crippling and unproductive concepts that the feminist collective suffers
from in their debates about change are the alternatives for change. In the words of a
feminist leader in Nasawiya “you either have something to say in order to be critical,
provide a tactic of c change or a solution; otherwise don’t speak and let the rest work.”
The language of solution here is foregrounded, the dealing with every part of oppression
as a problem to be solved became an important part of the discourse, which fed into the
adaptation of the lobbying for the law. Criticizing something for the sake of critiquing it
without feeling the intimidation of these power hierarchies among those who are

70

working, versus those who are thinking, reflecting and being critical. This form of
discursive strategy in a political collective proved to be very dangerous since it created a
divide between those who are working (those who are close to the leader) and those who
are observing without being given a chance to be acknowledged as someone smart
enough or taken seriously enough to be included in the political work. The latter strategy
tames the ability to be critical. In one of my interviews I was told by a woman that the
feminist space was one of the most unwelcoming hostile spaces she has ever been to. She
described how hostile the feminist space was in accepting newcomers, especially if they
were not a close person to one of the founding members. I personally have witnessed the
brutal attack and intimidation that people can face for simply being critical about a
certain type of work without suggesting an alternative. For instance at meetings when
someone gets critical of a certain political statement the answer from the leadership was
mostly: well if you don’t like it, then come and do it better. Derrida explains how
discourses come into being. When there is no center point in which structures and
language emerged everything became discourse (Derrida, 1966 p. 28). The feminist
collective for example claimed that its foundation is grassroots, thus there isn’t any
structure of power and leadership in it. The latter as Derrida argued replaced structure of
power and leadership hierarchies with a discourse of inclusion and exclusion.
If law is looked at from these points of view, as a unique language of
communication between the ethical and the political that extends beyond discourse to
social context, then law can be assumed as a language by it’s own that
communicates/dictates ethical social values and moralities. Kafka in his novel The Trial
illustrates descriptively the impossibility of escaping the bureaucratic nature of law and
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how morbid it can get; this language of the law deployed and complicated by state agents
cannot and does not give justice to anyone according to Fraser (2009). She argues that the
person who is giving the judicial order is after all a human being from a certain
background and comes with her/his own package of ideologies. The latter makes it
impossible for the law to give justice since a human being can never be fully impartial
(Fraser, 2009, p.2). Feminist legal theorists such as Fraser, Mennon and Brown engaged
previously have invited the feminist debate to extend to a political debate beyond the law.
Building on Aradau’s (2008) insights this research reflects and argues further
about the law as a tool of state control to impose surveillance and securization on borders
and citizens in the name of protection. According to Aradau (2008) discourses on ethics
of humanity are reduced to govermentality, in a sense that in order to feel sympathy,
empathy or the need for change a person that is being subjected to injustice has to be
deemed vulnerable and thus produced as a victim. The women interviewed in this
research who support the passing of the domestic violence law kept reflecting on the
contradictory nature of wanting the law. From their perspective the law is needed,
because there is no other option. Otherwise they have to question what the alternatives
are and where to start. If not within the system then where is the biggest question.
In a one on one conversations at a feminist social event I was reflecting on how
complicated it is for us to start breaking out of the neoliberal mode of thinking and start
imagining emancipation outside those modalities. Sara, my interlocutor wisely pointed
out, who are us? You are assuming that everyone in the feminist movement wants
emancipation.
You see it is not only a mode of thinking, it is a life style,
what do we do if we got emancipated? It might be feminism
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to some of us, but to others, it is simple a business. This is
not to dismiss or undermine all the efforts the feminists
are doing, this is just a critical gaze and a questioning of
who are we? Do we want to get our hands dirty in the
streets? Or do we just want the good feeling that is
derived from deluding ourselves that we are doing
something? (Sara, January 2014).
While she talked to me I recalled moments of discussions about one of the more
controversial protests we were planning to mobilize for in Nasawiya and the debate was
whether we have reasons to strike with a protest at that point of time or wait until
something major happens. One part of the group that usually stressed the value of
protesting to keep visibility, keep reclaiming space and objecting– argued that if we want
emancipation, we should never get out of the street until it becomes a way of living. The
other part of the group, consisting of people that mostly needed an event to hold a protest
and were always weary of people burning out, thought of it as pure waste of resources
and was scared that people participating in such a long-term process of confrontation
with the state get drained. In a space that is very political, the space of reflecting on who
we are (mostly in majority middle class/upper middle class AUB/LAU graduates)
becomes very tight and dangerous but necessary. It is noteworthy here that not everyone
from the feminist group Nasawiya is middle class/upper middle class, and not every
member is a prestigious university graduate, though the leadership was. A leadership that
always framed the actions of the rest of members while presuming a structureless
hierarchy.
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Chapter 4
On the politics of desire & concealment:
Notes to the left

The identifiable form of the court of law belongs to the bourgeois ideology
of justice. (Foucault, 1972, p. 210)

Introduction
This chapter engages the sphere of politics and the social imagination that
produces the desire for the law. I contend that the desire for the law is like a rhizome that
ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains and organizations of power
as Deleueze and Guatari describe it. It does not simply emerge from a one layer of cause
or effect. Its base I argue is a circumscribed sphere that emerges within a certain socio economic politics that derives its strength from the politics of concealment that the state
applies to the making of everything, especially the law. If the power relations that
constitute the law are concealed then the law appears as the neutral ideal solution, the
desired subject-object that is lobbied for by the Lebanese feminist collective Nasawiya
and the NGO Kafa. Therefore I find it crucial to disentangle and make visible the power
relationships that are concealed in creating the politics of desire for laws. Nothing exists
outside of power, power is the glue that holds together human relationships. But the
power that I speak of in this section is one that functions to conceal the relationships it
carries inside. This consequently leads to the creation hierarchies of power that produces
a certain type of oppression against a certain group of people; in this research, it’s the
power relationships that produce the desire to law, in parallel to those that produce
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domestic violence against women. This group of people can be identified by the way law
is practiced with or against them. In Lebanon, as in most of the world, you don’t have a
choice whether you want to be ruled by the law or not, you just are. Thus it is taken for
granted that the law is there, it is normalized within the social that it is what should
happen for the sake of organizing society, for the sake of order. If the law is a tool to
organize society and maintain order, the specificity of that which organizes society varies
from one country to another. Thus what is specific about the rule of law in Lebanon is
that it is one that changes according to one’s religion, sect, gender and class. The law is
hegemonic, it is represented as one that serves everybody, especially in Lebanon, but it is
consumed by a certain class, is lobbied for by a certain class. The lobbying to the law and
the process where it takes place and gets applied is not equally distributed on any level of
gender or class. To state it simply, in order to go under the rule of the law you need a
lawyer, which costs money. On the other hand, yes some NGOs provide people who
can’t afford lawyer expenses with free legal services, but here where the complexity of
this whole process lies. It is important to question how do the NGOs that lobby for laws
emerge? How does the whole process of lobbying become a cycle that creates NGOs.
Where do these NGOs get funding from? What type of state apparatus do NGOs lobbying
for laws reproduces? How do gender governance bodies that provide funds for NGOs
manage to curb feminist movements into NGOs via a neoliberal agenda that seeks to
tame militancy under the rule of law, generating seemingly good citizen that works
within the boundaries of the control of the law, instead of being critical of the law,
regulation, control and the Lebanese state itself? This complexity is what I try to unpack
in this chapter.
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The politics of concealment I speak of is manifested in the way the lobbying for
laws proceeds. Actors or activist do not necessarily intend to reproduce a certain global
governance discourse where the trials of subsumption of the feminist collective into the
neoliberal system are visible. They act according to the visible in society, the normative,
which is in this case having laws and lobbying for more of them. The politics of deciding
what the visible cause that gets attention from the movement and is invested in goes back
to leadership and the access to a certain language of human rights and funds that
eventually define leadership. The circumscribed state/activist game gets more complex,
when the activities of the state that produces laws and the power relationships that are
within it are concealed. The law then is represented as the savior to society and activists.
It is taken for granted that we need the law, but why do we need the law? Is it that we will
end up killing each other if we don’t get order through state and law? As Agamben
(1996, p.2). observes, “In the Hobbesian foundation of sovereignty, life in the state of
nature is defined only by its being unconditionally exposed to a death threat” The death
threat is the one constantly hungry for protection, for preservation of life. Consequently,
this exactly is what a neoliberal mode of thinking is, this simple question of killing each
other, of the evil of human nature (as if there is anything as such) where the core of the
neoliberal mode of thinking lies. If the neoliberal mode of thinking assumes that the
world without the law or rules will lead to people killing each other, and once this idea is
normalized within society especially that it is mostly the only way in which societies are
organized, therefore protection for human beings from each other would be an idea that is
comforting and provides safety to people. Whether there is an evil nature of human
beings or not is not within the scope of this thesis, but the idea behind mentioning this
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specific point is to disentangle one of the reasons the idea of the law is normalized and
accepted within society. The protection that laws pretend to provide to people and the
way the law supposedly gives justice to people justifies the desire for it.

Who are “we”? And how is our social imagination constructed?
Here I would like to go back to the end of chapter three where one of my
interlocutors asked who are we, a question that kept resonating in my mind for a while. Is
there a “we” in general? Are we one entity? Or are we a multiplicity of entities each
within one’s self that engage with the outside worlds and then become similar in ideology
as a result of the types of oppression that every individual faces in the everyday. Is there a
becoming a singular homogenous entity? Understanding the everydayness of oppression
becomes crucial in understanding the base of what brings different people together under
the umbrella of ideological practices such as feminists from Nasawiya. After all, when it
comes to the violence of the everyday it can eventually become a matter of life or death.
Moreover, and regardless of death, it’s the quality of life that is defined by the everyday
that matters.
Of course in a nutshell the answer is no we are not one. But the image is far more
complex than a mathematical equation that can be solved by an answer, even though
sometimes the neoliberal mode of thinking is fond of problem solutions quick answers, if
one shifts their mode of thinking from questioning what are people, to realizing that
people are a process of constant becoming, then the complexity of the image gets
unpacked. Who are we? Most of us might be political actors. The feminist collective in
Beirut is perceived to the social as a group of people who are actively engaged in
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lobbying for women rights, but then again what is beyond that is that the “we”. What do
“we” as a feminist collective have in common might be what Taylor calls a social
imaginary. “The social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible
common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy “(Taylor, 2002, p.106).
Through his explanation of what social imaginary is, Taylor argues that the sphere of
politics whether through the media, or through any other social discourse of interaction
among people is curbed and simultaneously produced by a set of theories that became
constitutes how we imagine our society to be. The common understanding in the
Lebanese feminist collective, the understanding of the importance of resisting the
injustice of the everyday. These practices eventually become legitimate through a group
of people practicing them. What is problematic here in this relationship of power and
resistance to power between the Lebanese state and the feminist collective that does not
exist in vacuum. I contend that the way the mobilization for resistance is contained within
a certain social imagination that views the passing of laws as the only guarantee for
women’s equality and crucial for emancipation.
In this section, I try to analyze how a feminist collective with subversive politics as
I elaborated in the introduction and in chapter three via interviews with my interlocutors,
came to take on lobbying for a law to protect women from domestic violence. Going back
to Taylor, he argues that “The arrangement of functions that it exhibits is not simply
contingent, it is “normal” and right. That the feet are below the head is how it should be.”
(Taylor, 2002, p.96). If law is the arrangement of function of society then its
normalization as a tool of justice and achieving equality is so normal that it is left
unquestioned in the way people resist, that it became a given. The law becomes common
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sensical, the organizer of society as much as the feet are below the head.
Taylor continues that the way our social imagination is constructed is not arbitrary,
neither is it historically contingent, but specific and based on an imagination that leads to
theorization. Within an historical analysis Taylor discusses how “A strong economy
eventually came to be seen as the collective goal of society” (Taylor, 2002, p.102). Even
though one might doubt the link between the strong economy and the law, a marriage of
Marx’s capitalist mode of production to Taylor’s social imagination and Althusser can
lead to an understanding of how the law is directly related to the production of a healthy
economy. Moreover how the law sustains and reproduces this healthy economy.
The need for the law as Taylor argues came from a need to organize society in
order to keep the mode of production of society as one that increases the gaps between
the ruling class and the working class (Taylor, 2002). The law to put it bluntly was
created in order to regulate the outlaws that are the poor, in order not to revolt against the
rich, to organize property and keep the power hierarchies in society as ones that function
on the bases of misdistribution of recourses.
In the case of the Lebanese feminist collective Nasawiya and NGOs represented in
this research as Kafa lobbying for the law, what lies behind the lobbying for the law is
not only that it became normalized within the collective social imagination. This is
comprehended by the politics of concealment of the power relations that takes place in
the process of producing and applying the law. Law is about govermentality, a mobile
body of legislations that domesticate its subjects as it moves. The law also is about
securization and walling for the protection of the borders of the nation states (Aradau,
2008), thus appearing as protection for the good of the people.
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In order to understand the very subtle links between the economy, regulations,
governmentality and securization one needs to look at the politics of producing and
reproducing the social imagination that normalizes the law as the solution for the ills of
society. People and states are historically produced as a sphere that is circumscribed by
politics of visibility and concealment. Althusser argues “what classical political economy
does not see, is not what it does not see, it is what it sees; it is not what it lacks, on the
contrary, it is what it does not lack; it is not what it misses, on the contrary, it is what it
does not miss. The oversight, then, is not to see what one sees, the oversight no longer
concerns the object, but the sight itself (Althusser, 1970, p.21). The latter discusses the
politics of concealment in the socio-economical power relations that take place in
political economy. It is not about what is visible to the eye or to the mind. It is more
about the relationships of power, the hierarchies of injustice, and the binaries that are
concealed within the production of political economy. It is similar to the example of
Marx when the author engages in a talk about commodities that are being sold, where
when you see a product on the shelf of a super market, you don’t see the labor time spent
in building it, neither do you see the power relations of exploitation of labor that goes
into it. You do not see the overtime, the tiredness, the emotions, abuse and labor time that
went into producing a simple supermarket purchased product every day. The same
analogy can be applied to the law; the law in that sense I argue can be perceived as a
commodity that is consumed by the public on daily basis, admired, respected,
normalized, and consumed as a giving good within the social imagination. Most
importantly, desired because of the politics of concealment that goes into it. The power
relations that go into applying and producing the law are always hidden; what is projected
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to the surface as visible to the public when talking about the law of domestic violence and
any other law under the sun is their ability to protect and organize society.
It is common knowledge that every time someone argues that someone should
consider that laws might be bad for society, among a group of three people, one of them
is always ready to question your law critique by asking you: do you want society to break
down? Do you want people to eat each other? And that is exactly how law sustains itself,
through a mode of crisis that is represented as an exception, while, mostly it is the rule.
Agamben in that sense states it clearly, "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the
'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule.” (Agamben, 1996
p.152,3). He proceeds to argue “How could we not think that a system that can no longer
function at all but on the basis of emergency would not also be interested in preserving
such an emergency at any price?” (Agamben, 1996 p.152,3). Therefore, the state of
emergency that is presented as an exception has become the normal state of being. The
Lebanese system feeds on the state of emergency in order for it to not only preserve its
power of ruling through the law, thus practicing it’s control and domesticating the
subjects of society. But also, in order to preserve its ruling class that always distracts the
masses with this state of emergency that legitimize its existence. An example of how the
ruling class distract the masses is by putting them under the threat of a potential
upcoming civil war every time a clash or an incident happens. For example the word
“wehde wataniya” (national unity) is included in every speech that any politician,
minister, party leader gives after an explosion. The term national unity that need to be
protected, even though over used by politicians and emptied of its content, works as a
reminder of its contrary, the non national unity that eventually lead to war before. The
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politicians do not necessarily have to clearly state to the people that if they do not
preserve the so called national unity the war will break out, they only have to hint
towards it, thus preserving the anxiety and the feeling of the state of emergency. If the
state of emergency, which feeds on the existence of crisis disappears, the ruling class that
needs to rule, would seize to exist. Consequently, the ruling class derives its power of
ruling, through imposing the law as order, in order to preserve society from the fear of
chaos and the unknown. Order, security and organization of the social become valid in
opposition of the very feared of the know and unknown. The inexperienced or the
formerly experienced .
On the other hand, the relationships of power that are concealed in the constant
production of laws are what legitimize its existence to the masses. The masses are not
stupid; neither do they have an inherent need or desire for laws, governmentality and
regulations. The masses take what is presented as a solution to violence. For example,
when you go to a shop to buy a shirt that is produced in a sweatshop, what you buy, what
is visible to you is the product itself. What is concealed is the exploitation of workers that
went into producing the shirt, and the economical social power relations that took place
economically and socially for a person to desperately need a job so much so that they
work in a sweatshop. Moreover the process of shipping it to your geographical location,
what politics go into that, what geographies of power apply?
Similarly, when the law is constantly produced as the social regulator of human
nature’s (as if there anything as such) inherent evil, what is concealed is how laws
historically came to being in order to regulate property and constitute an economy. and
how it institutionalized class hierarchies and sectarianism in the case of Lebanon. The
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constant reproduction of the need for law by lobbying for it, is legitimizing the existence
of the law, thus empowering and solidifying the police states.

Production of politics of desire and affect.
Conversations with most of my interlocutors revealed an immense desire for the
law regardless of the politics of concealment that takes place in the constant reproduction
of the law as the solution to the problem of violence against women. But in order to
understand the complexity of building a social imagination that endorses the law as the
solution against domestic violence, one needs to unpack first the complexity of desire and
how it is produced.
Deleuze argues that all we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and
segmentarities” (Deleuze and Guatari, 1987, p.27). There are multiple of ways in which
change is imagined, nothing is singular, there is no one single process, there are multiple
processes that take place at the same time, some happen at the same time in parallel, other
processes intersect, but what is important to understand is that this chapter does not
pretend that there are no other processes or mobilizations for change that are happening.
What I try to capture here is how change is imagined and how is it absorbed by the
neoliberal practices via state and the human rights language and discourse. In this chapter
I explore how a process of emancipation is embodied in a desire for laws. And how laws
in this specific neoliberal moment of history became a commodity in which they include
a value in them?
Marx argues value has to meet a need and a desire otherwise it’s loose its essence
of value within the capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1982). The neoliberal mode of
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thinking shapes laws as desired objectified values that are needed in order to solve a
problem. The problem solution in this thesis is the law against domestic violence against
women, which is perceived as the solution to violence against women. On the other hand
the crisis of violence is produced by the same neoliberal system in which state have
control over human lives thus one that allows violence against them, especially women.
Moreover the state, along with the people, produce this need and desire out of crisis by
shaping the modes of thinking of the need for state, especially once the power relations
that goes into the law is concealed. States create the economic, social, and discursive
situations in which violence against women is possible. Therefore the desire of the law
becomes a tool in the hand of state in order to not only practice it’s securization for
protection of the people, thus policing, regulating and controlling the masses. These
processes also absorb the mobilization of feminist collectives such as Nasawiya via
producing the law as an object of desire, that eventually feeds into reproducing the same
power hierarchies of control and multi leveled modes of oppression.
In order to unpack this argument there’s a need to understand first what is a
commodity? Moreover to be clear, there’s a need to understand that the law is not an
object by itself, it is more of a regulatory apparatus that becomes a desired object, but not
an object by itself.
Marx argues that a commodity appears as a simple economical transaction. It is a
thing that meets a human want or need, a bearer of something but not something by itself
(Marx, 1982). It is a bearer of exchange value that is a representation of human labor.
Therefore the law becomes a commodity through human labor on multiple frontiers. The
first frontier is the state. It constantly labors for the production of the law. The second
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frontier labors to achieve the passing of a law that is desired. Here I would like to draw
on the difference of these types of labors. The state in this case in Marxist language
becomes the capitalist that produce the need for the law. Capitalism in that sense is based
on producing a need in order for certain targeted consumers to consume it, so that
capitalism sustain itself, and legitimize its existence. If people stopped perceiving the law
as the savior, the problem solving magical solution for injustice and the power pole that
balances hierarchies, the state that is the perpetuator of violence will seize to exist. I
reiterate a point I made earlier: the state legitimizes its existence by the need of order,
security and organization. And that is exactly how the state tries to absorb resistance
against it, by producing the law as a desired object, as a solution, not only via its local
actors, but also through a gender governance narrative that got eventually adopted by
various NGOs and feminist collectives through the process of NGOization of movements.
According to Jana, who is writing a thesis about the history of Lebanese women
movement, the RDFL collective, the umbrella of most women’s NGOs in Lebanon ,
emerged from a militant group that was part of the communist party during the civil war.
The feminist politics that this group took and identified with lead them to breaking away
from the communist party because they fought with the men in the group over their
feminist agenda. The process of NGOization of militancy regardless of its sectarian
nature in the Lebanese context is part of what is called “a moment of capitalist
accumulation profoundly marked by gender” (Keating, Rasmussen, and Rishi, 2010,
p154). This process does not only function within the axes of the economy, but in order
to alternate the economy and achieve the constant molding of capitalism that is based on
economic inequalities, and neoliberalism that is based on securization, police state and
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control over people, where both intersect and are in dialectical relationship with each
other in order to maintain each other. The capitalist mode of accumulation needs to
alternate the existing social structures that enables such process of accumulation to
happen. Women in Lebanon before the NGOization process by human rights institutions
that took place in the Arab world according to Jad have a long history of militancy.
Warda Ibrahim for example is one of the martyrs that died while fighting for labor rights
in 1964, in a confrontation with the tobacco industry in Lebanon (Kaebay, 2014).
Post-civil war Lebanon witnessed a pacifist wave of dealing with social issues. The
women movements that were militant during the civil war were domesticated in their
approach by turning into NGOs that provide services and lobby for laws as a strategy to
achieving social justice. Movement became reformists rather than militant. The
problematic of these NGOs is not the lack of their militancy per say but their ability and
acceptance to work within confessional structures, thus normalizing and reproducing the
sectarian system in Lebanon. Movements of women in Lebanon did not only get limited
to feminist agendas during and post-civil war. For example the movement of women that
investigated the disappeared during the civil war, was primarily composed of women.
The NGOization of women movements has translated into international support and
funding. By providing funding for these groups according to their agendas that normalize
with cultural differences and the confessional structures, these funds helped maintain this
system unchallenged (Khatab, 2010). Funding of NGOs according to my interlocutor
Hala an experienced NGO person, influences the way these NGOs work. Hala points out
that funding and competition surrounding funding between women NGOs tends to widen
the divide between those NGOs instead of building a network of solidarity in their fight
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against injustices (Hala, January 2014). The NGOization of militant women movements
is part of this global agenda of gender governance that managed to curb and absorb
movements of resistance such as feminists’ movements and women rights groups, leaving
countries such as Lebanon with mostly women’s rights NGOs that provide services.
On the other hand, there’s another type of labor that is invested in this lobbying
for laws by the feminist collective, especially by a Nasawiya who defines itself by a set
of ideologies that conflict with the desire for the law. The law here becomes a commodity
that is a bearer of affect human labor that includes a lot of intense emotional labor along
with immaterial labor. According to Rodriguez (2010, p.5) “Affects are not just perceived
as emotions and feelings, but as intensities, sensations and bodily reactions disturbing,
but also stretching and reaffirming, power relations.” Affect, she continues, drives us to
act by transforming emotions into actions. (ibid) The sets of emotions that are attached to
lobbying for the law that is the bearer of the labor of emotions that is in a constant
relationship of power with the state, is one of the forces that pushes the feminist
movements to lobby for the law.
I find it important here to reflect on an event that took place during my
engagement in the feminist collective in order to elaborate on how actors involved in the
feminist collective through lobbying for the law are engaged in affective labor. In 2012,
the government was again delaying acting on the domestic violence law legislation,
procrastinating in studying it, passing it, and complicating its process by distorting it. A
call for a meeting in Nasawiya was announced on the mailing list and the meeting was
about thinking of ways in order to push the government to pass the law. Back then I was
heavily involved in lobbying for the law. Along with other colleagues I was critical of the
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government, slightly critical of the law as a mode of governance but at the same time I
was supportive of its passing. In anticipation of a long awaited victory, many people
showed up to that meeting, where consequently the collective ended up organizing a
march on International Women’s Day. We decided that this year the collective will not
celebrate the day but mourn. Nasawiya members along with other members from Kafa
and other NGOs took the streets carrying a tomb on their shoulders, wearing black and
holding white roses as a gesture of mourning all the women who died from domestic
violence. The meeting I mentioned lead to another meeting where a group of us decided
to take a radical step: a hunger strike in front of the parliament. A group of the collective
took various tasks in order to plot for the hunger strike and working out logistics for our
strike tent. We decided on an open protest until the law is passed, without the distortion
that the committee studying it added. Eventually, for various political clashes among the
collective and conflicting opinions, the hunger strike did not materialize. Although the
hunger strike did not take place, what is important here is to look at the proposal and the
strategic planning that took place for it by itself. Hunger strikes were and have been a
feminist strategy historically in order to pressure governments into complying with
various feminist agendas. Back then we thought: you want dying women, since you are
not passing the law that will protect women from domestic violence, we will give you
dying women. We will go on a hunger strike and if it takes death to pass this law, then
death is what you get. It was an extremely emotional moment, a moment of both
desperation and hope. Back then the idea of death sounded like the perfect way out of
desperation and back into the power of controlling the situation of non-ending violence.
Those of us who decided to engage in the hunger strike were scared, worried and
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anxious. Much emotional labor was invested in this decision. The intensity of putting
your body on food deprivation in order to pressure the government into passing a law that
is represented as one that will give justice to women that are being abused and violated
everyday by their husbands made perfect sense. The political entangled with the
emotional, with the affect of laboring your body to the extent of death, is what I mean by
the law as a commodity carrying inside it affect labor.
In another event, months later, another call for an urgent act was called, but this
time from Kafa. A meeting was called in order to organize a die in. What is a die in? A
die in as we planned it was a non-violent direct action whereby a group of people, mostly
women would drop dead in front of the parliament as a symbolic act that represented the
death of women. Again the idea was the same: you want dying women by not passing
this law; we will give you dying women. The direct action was very discreetly planned
since it took place in front of the parliament. Usually any type of action, whether protest
or any type of political gathering is not allowed inside the downtown clock area where
the parliament meetings take place in front of parliament. The area on that day was highly
charged with state security. It took a lot of time to plan how to infiltrate the security
system as a group without being noticed. Each group of around ten people went to a
different entrance, met in the middle of the downtown square in front of the parliament
where two street theater actors started the scene by a man slapping his wife, and then the
moment she fell, was the cue for all the activists that were there to fall with her. The
result was media photos of dead women in front of the parliament that resonated to the
extent that every protest that came after the sit in in front of the parliament received a
very violent reaction from the police. The result of such actions is not necessarily the
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most important aspect of them; their importance lies in the laboring of emotions that
takes place in the process of performing such acts. In these two events I tried to portray
how vital passing the law was for the feminist collective and Kafa and how they
collaborated together and engaged in affective labor in order to lobby for it. These two
events show how desired the law is and how activists would literally ‘die to pass it’. This
sense of desperation does not come from nowhere; its base is violence.
In Beirut, the violence that is inflicted on women seems endless. I reiterate here
what I tackled in chapter two, that violence is something that varies from one person to
another and is not something that can be spoken of objectively. In order to be specific I
will resort back to chapter three, where I described the violence that result from domestic
violence, that mostly end up in death. Death is not the only thing that matters but the
everyday of a person who is living under this type of violence is equally important. Death
has some kind of power in triggering certain awareness about domestic violence, which is
problematic by itself. Do women need to keep dying in order for something to change?
This is always a question. The death of women that results from domestic violence put
the feminist collective and women right groups in a state of desperation. The more
vulnerability of women that is produced by a narrative of protection by state, the more the
desire for a law is guaranteed. In his discussion of commodities Marx argues that they are
a thing that meets a human need or want. The law, I contend, needs to meet a need in
order for the people to lobby for it, there needs to be a crisis with a solution that is
represented as the law. Thus comes the desire for the law that I elaborate on through my
ethnographic fieldwork with my interlocutors and their contradictory desire for the law.
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The Politics of Desiring the Law
Foucault (1985, p. 43) argues that the underlying incentive behind desire is
pleasure; any act performed by desire should result in a climax of pleasure. Pleasure is
the engine that fuels desire; in the case of the feminist movement in Beirut the pleasure of
passing a law is embodied in winning over the state in multiple ways. The pleasure of
winning over the state does not exist in a vacuum. The pleasure of passing a law is
deeper, as I elaborated earlier domestic violence is a matter of life or death, and a matter
of the way one lives one’s life, a life that is ruptured everyday by an immense degree of
violence inflicted mostly by a husband against his wife, or father against his children and
wife. As I argued in chapter one, forcing the state through it’s actors, whether the
parliament members or the committee studying the domestic violence law, to admit that
domestic violence is violence against women and that it should not be tolerated. Second,
domestic violence should be refused (refusal here is represented as criminalized). Third,
winning a battle against the state by pressuring the government through various tools of
mobilization – whether through protests, advertisement campaigns or constant speaking
about the issue – means passing the law which has been proposed since more than seven
years.
The complexity and suffering and years of lobbying for the law does not only
symbolize the corruption, violence, sexism and corruption of state, also makes visible the
propaganda in which the law is produced as an object of desire.
It’s important to see the Kafa violence against women
law passing. This is one of the few times in Lebanon
when we get to see a law pass, even though it is not
exactly the same as the women’s movement had hope
it would be. We are going to have to wait a bit
and see what will happen” (Layla, January 2014).
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Layla stresses on the importance and the unusual event of viewing the law passing, she
also argues that it is important to see it pass even though it is not what the women’s
movement wanted. Here she is hinting to the fact that the committee studying the law
against domestic violence has distorted the law on various levels, adding and subtracting
words and materials that empty the law of its content. For example the part of the law that
tackles the Shari’a courts, where the committee refused to allow women divorce through
civil courts, which was one of the most important parts of the law. This following
statement can be analyzed in two parts, first the impossibility of the law passing makes
the feminist movement view the law as a farfetched goal that is very complicated to
reach, therefore the pleasure of reaching it appears as the aim. That aim leading the
mobilization centered around the law, and the complicated dynamics behind not believing
in the law but desiring it. Second when Lyla mentions that it is nice to view the law pass
despite the fact that it was distorted indicates how regulation of desire works within good
and bad subjects of power.
Foucault (1985, p.70) argues about desire that the “The moderate individual is not
one who has no desires but one who desires "only to a moderate degree, not more than he
should, nor when he should not." The good subject of power, the individual whether
intentionally or not, is curbed by a system that represents virtue through a moderate
desire. The desiring subject should not be greedy within the relationship of power with
the state, otherwise the desiring subject becomes a danger to state, an outlaw that is a
threat to the state’s well-being, people and sovereignty. The moderate desire is one that
does not want to topple down the state, a moderate desire is one that agrees to desire what
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gender governance and the state wants it to believe that it is the solution for domestic
violence which is the law. Therefore, when any type of actors or activist that transgress
the mobilization within the law, are perceived as an outlaw by state, and also by the
women rights groups. Thus leaving such collectives to stand on their own in the face of a
these power hierarchies.
People do have desires, but one needs to ask what are the class dynamics involved
in desire? Is the language of human rights, if assumed as the language of the privileged,
accessible to anyone other than the middle class? In the interviews, some of my
interlocutors hinted towards the complexity of the lower class/working class to the
materialization of this desire via a discussion of what type of language and privilege you
need to have in order to have access to acting on your desires when it comes to human
rights work.
Even in grassroots movements, people mostly become
leaders of the movements because they have access
to the grassroots.? Especially in Beirut they have to
have a certain profile, the profile for example entail
their ability to speak English, know the language of
the donors and the funders and know how to deal with
them. This language is very specialized and people
who are even from a college graduate level do not
have access to it since it is similar to the
academic language (Manal, December 2013).
Manal brought up this argument when I asked her if she identifies as a feminist or
a human rights activist, she frowned at the idea of human rights activism. Her observation
is quite interesting in understanding the way in which human rights activism works. In
her answer she touched on the link between human rights activism and the way the
feminist movement in Lebanon functions. Even within grass roots movements which the
feminist collective Nasawiya claims to be, the person in power is the one that can speak
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to the funders in English in order to get funds. Speaking the language of human rights
entails certain set of synonyms and antonyms such as capacity building, empowerment
and development. Now the important point to think through via this statement is the
access of the non English speaking, non human rights speaking class to funding. This
class might not be uneducated but specifically have less privilege and access. Foucualt
(1972, p. 210) argues that “The identifiable form of the court of law belongs to the
bourgeois ideology of justice.” The law as a hegemonic concept is based on regulating
the lower class and protecting the property of the upper class, therefore what happened
via the gender governance agenda is a proliferation of the law. Activism in order to
balance out certain types of power hierarchies that produce violence against women is
swallowed by an agenda that protects state and the upper class by lobbying for the law,
instead of actually forming a power sphere that addresses the base of these inequalities,
the production of this desire, and the root of injustice that is perpetuated by state. The
elite, who know the language of human rights and know how to speak to funders in this
language gets the funds and through this, gain access to leadership. This process leads the
leadership who have access to this language to lead movements and inflict on them this
language. Consequently, what happens in these relationships of power between the grass
roots subjects and their leaders (no matter how much structure-less a movement pretend
to be) is that those who have access to the human rights language, the ones that can
guarantee access to a fund become the ones who define the discursive way in which the
mobilization of this movement takes place. When the bourgeois (here identified as the
English speaking, human rights speaking person) is curbed within the human rights
language and discourse the whole movement gets curbed into it as well. The latter does
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not mean that on an individual basis there are no resistant subjects to this language or to
the bourgeois discourse, and this analysis does not intent to take agency away from the
activists and actors in such movements. It has been already established in chapter three
that the human rights discourses and mobilizations are based on acts that negotiate power
with state in a way that reproduce state power by legitimizing state. Indeed this analysis
leads to questioning not only leadership of movements, language, and ways and tools of
mobilization but as well the formation of desire.
Brown (1993) in a critique of Foucault argues “"My quarrel here is not with
Foucault's valuable insistence on freedom as a practice but with his distinct lack of
attention to what might constitute, negate, or redirect the desire for freedom” (ibid,
p.398). If freedom is a desire, whether freedom of violence or any other kind of
oppression, then this desire does not exist in a vacuum away from the dialectical power
that runs the world. Moreover, desires of the feminist collective cannot be detached,
especially in this historical moment, from the way emancipation is being portrayed by
human rights legislations and treaties via the gender governance discourse as a stagnant
aim that cannot move beyond laws that claim to achieve gender equality. Brown (ibid, p.
398) notes further that “It is not a question about when or where the practice of freedom
is possible but a question about the direction of the will to power, a will that potentially,
but only potentially, animates a desire for freedom. The will of power in most of my
interviews was directed towards the achievement of the law, and then contradicted by
knowledge that alone it will not solve anything.
Maya: Why do you believe in the law?
Nivine: I don’t know. I think it’s the bases of a
civil society, we have a problem, that’s how a society
work, by law, Laws can work in favor of society and we
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need a culture of non-corruption. The law is not alone enough;
you need a culture of respecting the law. Do you think the law
will stop a man from beating his wife? If there’s no punishment
and accountability there’s a problem. Eventually yes, the law
will, to begin with, no. (Nivine, January 2014).
Nivine’s reflections illustrate how the politics of concealment in the power relations that
produce and reproduce the law is visible, how the desire of the law is not grounded in a
solid ideology but the “ I don’t know.” An analysis of the word I don’t know here is
crucial. We simply do not know, because the origin of why the law was created is lost in
a time and space, ahistorized and so normalized that it became a tool of curbing people’s
social imagination, law hence can be deployed through various actors of global
governance through programs of gender governance that sustains it.

Spaces for subversion
Even though Taylor describes how our imagination is curbed within a system that
frames it and tames it, interviews with some of my interlocutors revealed that within the
feminist collective imagination of emancipation there’s always a room for subversion.
For example Souad, who joined the collective most recently about a year ago, narrated to
me during her interview how after being involved in the collective for a short time she
realized that there is something deeply dysfunctional in the way things are done. She
talked about how she thought in the beginning that change can happen within the system,
but afterwards how she started realizing that this tactic is just a reproduction of what has
been done before, therefore reproducing the failure to actually balance the power
hierarchies that produce various types of oppression. Souad noted that political
movements in Lebanon are always reactionary to crisis.
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It is always crisis that we are trying to solve to the extent
that we never have the time to sit back and rethink what
we are doing. Our work is always reactionary, never
thought through to the future” (Souad, January 2012).
Agamben as quoted earlier states that states are based on a constant production of
crisis, similarly Zizek obsrves that the problem with the left that it is one that is lost in
illusions of reform instead of actually confronting the system with a mentality of thinking
and imagining change outside the system. Souad’s interview is a great indicator that even
though most people’s imagination, whether activist or not, think of reform, there’s always
space for rethinking these tactics. These spaces do not form out of nowhere, they are
always in a constant movement of trial and error. It is the precious moment of reflection
and self critique though that defines who give themselves spaces to pause and think.
Moreover Souad’s take on the passing the domestic violence law was very
enlightening. By the time I interviewed her, the law was passed from the committee that
was studying it, distorted and emptied from its content as I mentioned before. Back then
she was as well very critical of the law. When I asked her what she thinks of the domestic
violence law she stated:
If we passed the law against domestic violence,
it will not change anything, people do not understand
why I was so pissed off when the law passed from the
committee, it is just a way to shut people up so they
stop being angry and we need people to stay angry.
I think we need to drop the idea of state and start
taking matters in our own hands. I think people
should take matters in their own hands. It’s not
only about talking to provide solutions, we
need to talk to people, we should work
together to create solutions, we need community
work in order to build trust in a movement.
I don’t want to save people; we need to fix the
power dynamics here. (Saoud, January 2013).
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When I asked her of what she thinks of the UN work she again stated:
The last things that UN do is empower people,
they make people dependent on them to feel secure,
and that’s not empowering people, that’s
creating another type of dependency. The UN tactic is
as follows “I’ll feed you, without me you die,
but here here, I am empowering you”
Souad’s interview made me realize that interaction on daily basis with various modes of
power dynamics do not always tame people, it also gives space to rebel. Passing the
desired law in order to what she phrases as “shut people up and stop making them angry”
portrays perfectly what I have tried to argue through all this chapter, if not through out
this thesis. This neoliberal tactic that keeps trying to absorb movements, feminist
collectives and any type of resistance have an anesthesia effect on people, representing
reform as the perfect solution, yet again reproducing the same system of oppression. But
as Foucault states, wherever there’s oppression, there’s resistance.

In this chapter I tried to elaborate how our social imagination have been curbed
through state and gender governance in order to view the law as problem solving tool for
the ills of this world, the injustices of domestic violence in specific. It is all about
perception of things; people might perceive things similarly or differently. Color theory
states that there are three primary colors but at the same time, every color we see around
is a mixture of various colors in order for the color to reflect what an object cannot
absorb. For example most of the people look at a green leaf and what they see is what is
perceived as a fact: the color of a lead is green. But at the same time, color theory states
that a green leaf is not only green, it is actually a mix of colors, but the only color that the
leaf could not absorb is the green color which is the one that gets reflected to our eyes,
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and then we perceive our vision of it as green. The politics of the power relations in the
law are similar. There is one thing that is reflected and represented as a solution via
various apparatuses of governance, whether self governance or state governance.
Therefore, it is no wonder the law becomes a desire for those in distress and desperation.
It is represented as the solution of crisis. This analysis does not mean to deprive hope
from reading the present; it is actually the exact contrary. It is moments of realizations
and consciousness that things are not exactly what they appear visible to our eyes and
minds that make one engage in an endeavor to analyze them further and think through
them, which leads to becoming critical. I elaborated on how the law becomes a
commodity that is a barer of affect human labor, how the law is produced as an object of
desire, in order to more fully understand why people lobby for laws. The singer Ani
Difranco in lyrics from her song “My country Tis of Thee” states “why don’t you just go
ahead turn off the sun, because you’ll never live long enough to, undo everything they’ve
done to you”. If our social imagination is curbed within the system that produces violence
against us and then solidified through a neoliberal system that proliferates the law as a
solution, thus leaving more space for securization, how can we escape this problem
/solution dichotomy, how can we think not in solutions but in questions? How else can
we view the world as a sphere of circumscribed politics without solidifying the problem
as a stagnant knot? How else can we understand that the world, Lebanon, that is in a
constant process of becoming, and push ourselves to the edge in order to be able to
imagine? Imagination and processes of becoming and a discussion of imagining
emancipation are at the core of chapter five.
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Chapter 5
Taking You for a Walk in an Emancipated Beirut
It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye”(The Little Prince)
Introduction.
In this concluding chapter, I unpack the imagination of my interlocutors by asking
them to imagine a walk in an emancipated Beirut. The value of this chapter does not lie in
the analysis of the statements made in the interviews. It aims towards a broader
illustration of the everyday in Beirut, and the lives of women in it. Questions of how they
maneuver public space and how they engage politically in larger questions about
neoliberalism within themselves is the goal behind asking the interlocutors to imagine an
emancipated Beirut. There is no one question in this chapter, there are multiple, but the
most important one is to question how do we question. I argue that there are no answers
at this moment of history; the answer lies in questioning our own mode of thinking and
its deployment in our modes of living.

Why Imagination.
As I begin to write this chapter, I find it crucial to begin by reflecting why among
all the topics I could’ve tackled in my final chapter, I chose to stress on imagining
emancipation. This chapter is an attempt to question what happens when the imagination
of collectives and individuals within the collectives that are working within a neoliberal
agenda are deeply disturbed by the consequences of neoliberalism, which mostly
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manifests in their imaginations through their discomfort with capitalism and sectarianism
in Lebanon. Moreover, it is an attempt to question what can possibly limit a political
imagination, an imagination in general, since it’s the product of one’s own thoughts, one
that belongs to people themselves. An idealized perception of what constitutes
imagination is that it is not under surveillance, not watched and not subjected to any
judgments from the outer world. Things imagined are thoughts that are inside one’s head,
supposedly they do not come out unless a person is asked to imagine or willingly share
their imagination and thoughts. Even though this perception of imagination is idealized,
this opens a space to question how much rooted this neoliberal mode of thinking have
become to the extent that even our imagination is saturated with it. As Savater (2014)
argues neoliberalism does not impose itself in a coercive way only, but it becomes a
mode of living, a lens in which we perceive the world around us. Therefore as a counter
strategy in this chapter I use imagination, as a lens in which I question the structures that
construct subjectivities by a system of oppression that either prohibits or absorbs
imagination. I aim in this chapter towards an analysis and an understanding of the
imagination of the interlocutors I interviewed throughout my thesis and my fieldwork in
Beirut. It must be noted that most of the things quoted in the interviews are selfexplanatory. In my analysis of them, I try to give the reader a deeper contextualization of
Lebanon, to facilitate the understanding of those imaginations. Furthermore, I highlight
issues that hint towards an intense level of discomfort in living within an age of
heightening of capitalism in Lebanon as will be elaborated later in this chapter.
To Think in Questions
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You can try this at home, in a coffee shop, in a collective, in a private
conversation over tea or in a collective debate. Mostly whenever you get to the
conclusion in an argument that the process of emancipation has become impossible
within the current way the system of oppression we live under functions – under
capitalism and neoliberalism – the first question that is asked would be: okay so what do
you suggest as an alternative? Here I would like to revisit Harvey’s (2007) observation
that

“neoliberalism has become a mode of thinking” to the extent that it became

inscribed in the way we think of emancipation. The way we think has become bound to
answers instead of questions. The latter assumes that the way oppression is structured,
especially that of women is static, thus freezing it in a timeless spatial sphere. By this act
of freezing, the hegemonic knot becomes so large that it gets too big to tackle on a small
daily life scale, while it is entrenched and condensed in the daily life practices. It
becomes a scary knot that sits on one’s chest and results in the suffocation that thinks of
finding a quick answers and quick solutions as a fresh breathe of oxygen. But if one looks
at the everyday, it’s noticeable that it is in constant flux, changing every second, molding
to accommodate this change or resisting it. Therefore, this mode of thinking that
stagnates the way we view things is becoming more and more blinded by finding the
solution to this crisis, still limited by assuming that crisis is the exception to our daily life,
while as argued before it is the rule. At this stage of history, it can be assumed that in
order to untie this knot that sits so heavily on our chests, we might want to first begin by
understanding it, and that would only happen the moment we start questioning it while
we understand as well that it is constantly in motion and a simple – or complicated –
problem solving act will not untie the knot.

102

The answer lies not in the answer itself, because at this moment of history there
are no answers, the process of emancipation lies in the pause, the pause to stop and think,
and rethink everything, whether the small details of the everyday or the big ideological
traps that indulges us with frustration. Imagine oppression as a big multifunctional
machine, that keeps producing injustice every second of the day, but being the smart
machine it is, from time to time it produces as well what looks like liberation, and having
a stagnant mode of thinking combined with the desperation as a result of constant crisis
perceive these little liberation moments as one that should increase. Thus one keeps
studying how to increase these moments of liberation. But once we understand that this
machine functions in binaries, that will mostly produce more oppression and liberation
together we won’t be able to stop it. To pause and question is similar to putting a
screwdriver in the machine’s engine to stop it.
I resort to Foucault (1969, p.24) in this chapter as he argues “We must question
those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any
examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those
forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of
another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign.” This quote hints
towards the obscurity of what produces the present, the dark forces as Foucault mentions
that produces a certain discourse around – in my research’s case – women rights. As I
elaborated in my previous chapters, I questioned the law as a pre-imposed body that is
assumed as emancipatory for women. I tried in my introduction to question the category
of the Lebanese women and tried to elaborate on how it is produced via state, human
rights discourses and reproduce them via lobbying by the feminist collective and women
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rights NGOs. I reiterate my point about questioning; the answer lays in the question, in
order to move the analysis about women collectives from stagnant water to clear ones in
order to understand the various discourses that produce them.
It is to be admitted that the results in this research are rather frustrating. It is the
realization that by “Simply desiring egalitarian relationships does not make them so”
(Sitrin, 2006, p.4). It is very visible that the desire of emancipation within the Lebanese
feminist collectives and women rights groups is very strong. Yet again the ways in which
emancipation is perceived vary, moreover it is limited by desiring laws. Through this
awareness, one can question and detangle what are egalitarian relationships and how are
they produced and perceived. The feminist collective and the women rights NGOs in
Lebanon desire egalitarian relationships very intensely but at the same time, this desire is
curbed by neoliberalism in believing in the law, thus the “does not make them so”. To be
critical enough to realize the limitation of the law as a body that can emancipate women
might not be the most pleasant realization, but it is indeed a step, or more a trial to
suggest moving forward away from the law and the Lebanese state in order to imagine
other possibilities for emancipation.
Answers from my interlocutors to my question of imagining an emancipated
Beirut sound like little ruptures in the narrative of this research. The contradiction
between their answers that I elaborate on later in this chapter and the way they work
within neoliberal gender governance agenda is an indication of the rupture itself. The
rupture that is induced every time someone asks you to pause, think, and imagine.
To propose imagining new ways of thinking about emancipation is not a
suggestion of an answer, it is more as I mentioned before a realization that our
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relationships are embedded in power dynamics that form the way we perceive the world.
“Our relationships are deeply affected by the power dynamics of capitalism and
hierarchy, which operate in our collective and creative spaces, especially in how we
relate to one another in terms of economic resources, gender, race, access to information
and experience. We see this arise often in our meetings, assemblies, activities, and
actions” (Sitrin, 2006, p.3). Indeed these relationships surface through out all this
research, it is visible in the way the collective is structured and how it functions, in how
the desire of a law to emancipate is always taken for granted instead of questioned. In
imagination I suggest that we start thinking in questions rather than answers, a process
that is not out of my own imagination, that is not new to collective mobilization but one
that became popular in Latin America. Horizontalism is the name of the new movements
that take into consideration the power hierarchies that form these movements and curb
the social imagination and challenge them merely by existing.
It is like a breath of fresh air, of the long awaited oxygen dose to know that there
are movements in the world that think in questions rather than answer. That does not
view freedom and liberation as a static body but as a process of becoming, thus working
constantly on aspiring and imagining. One, which does not aspire control for the sake of
order, and does not legitimize the existence of state under the illusion of protection.
Moreover working on deploying these imaginations within the everyday; “movements,
that are creating the future in their present social relationships (Sitrin, 2006, p.4). One can
argue for centuries about emancipation, but it can mostly manifest in the small acts that
structure the present in an egalitarian way that builds and leads to the process of an
emancipated future.
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A walk through Beirut
Before I start engaging with the literature about imaging an emancipated Beirut
and a walk through an emancipated Beirut, it is crucial here to note that most of my
interlocutors – regardless of how they imagined Beirut – had one dream in common: to
talk a walk in Beirut without being sexually harassed. Most of them imagined friendlier
streets that are less hostile. Ecobart argues that women’s bodies are the first cite where
politics take place. Thus this constant technique of pushing women out of the public into
the private highlights that regardless of how much Beirut is perceived as a city that is
women friendly, it denies them the simple joy of taking a walk in the public without
being sexually harassed.
The most overarching discovery that came as a surprise in my fieldwork was the
ideas, thoughts and dreams that I got out of asking my interlocutors to imagine an
emancipated Beirut. To simply imagine a walk in Beirut in the body of a woman. The
results were rather stunning for me by their simplicity in terms of desire. Most
importantly, the simplicity of the imagination of my interlocutors illustrated how faces of
capitalism, neoliberalism, sexism, classism, racism and sectarianism are embedded in the
everyday. Moreover how the dreams and imagination of the interlocutors is very resistant
to the various aspects of capitalism and sectarianism.
The first reaction for most of the people interviewed when I asked them to
imagine an emancipated Beirut was always “euf (a sigh of realization) I never thought
about this before” which made me aware of how much imagination is missing from our
collectives. The results on the other hand elaborated on how not only our imagination is
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important, but to elucidate those imaginations and to mobilize on their grounds is
extremely important.
Hala for example, a working class woman, that started her activism work around
women rights out of a deep sense that there is something wrong with the relationships of
power in the everyday towards her as woman imagined Beirut as non-capitalist
nonsectarian one.
I imagine Beirut without sectarian borders. A Beirut where
you can feel safe walking in the streets without sexual
harassment and without people questioning what your
religion is. Without the constant policing of your
body in the street. Moreover I want to walk in streets
where the streets are named after people who matter,
who did something useful for this world, not after
countries that colonized us, or politicians whom
oppressed us. Further more I want the Beiruty sea
to be accessible for everybody at least to look at,
not like it is now, with the existence of places
such as Zaitouna Bay, I don’t go to Zaitouna
Bay, the place gets on my nerves (Hala, January 2014).
Hala’s imagination of an emancipated Beirut captures a lot of how Beirut is
structured in the present. One that is highly capitalist with sectarian borders and that is
very unfriendly to its residents, women in specific, strangers as well. The borders that
Hala spoke of are a combination of left-overs from the Lebanese civil war and the current
neoliberal rise in Beirut. While whenever politics of Beirut is spoken of, there’s always
the mentioning of the national unity and co-existence of various sects together, it is
mostly and apart from few places the emerged in the past five years such as Hamra and
Mar Mkhayel El Naher, it is the exact contrary. Achrafieh for example is the place where
the Christians reside, Dahiye where the shiaa, Ras El Nabea where the Sunni, the jabal is
where the Druze. These places do not have physical borders or gates, but in the collective
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imagination of people residing in Beirut there are hypothetical borders that bound these
areas to certain sects. And sometimes the residents of these areas make sure to keep these
boundaries drawn, subtly but very strictly by making any stranger body feel estranged. In
order to elaborate on this point I would like to reflect on a personal experience that I
observed during my fieldwork. As I was taking a cab to Achrafieh, I went in while a
conversation was going on between the cab driver and another passenger. The driver was
a young man, barely in his late thirties and the woman was in her late fifties. It was
obvious that the driver was Christian, with the cross hanging of his mirror, and the
women as well a “native” resident of Achrafieh. The women went on speaking about how
Achrafieh is not for its native residents anymore, how old natives are selling their lands to
the ghorbie (strangers).

You see ghorbie everywhere she said; you don’t feel safe

walking in the streets anymore. She mentioned a couple of old native family names that
are still there and ended her talk with: Achrafieh is not ours anymore. To the reader this
might sound as a very abstract thing to say, but to a person born and raised in Lebanon
most of my life, especially born and raised in Achrafieh itself I could understand what the
women was hinting at. The stranger is the other, the Muslims, the Syrian, mostly anyone
who is not Christian and white European or American.
These are the borders that Hala speak of, and they can apply to any other place in
Beirut, this othering is not an abstract one that is spoken of by theory, but one that
manifests itself in the everyday. Everyone is always the other in Beirut most of the time,
and that’s where Hala’s imagination expanded to capture this othering, to refuse it and
rebel against it. The ability to imagine a Beirut without borders and hypothetical spatial
walls is the realization that there is something dysfunctional about the way it is in the
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present. But Hala’s imagination was not only bound to sectarianism, it was as well an
imagination of a less capitalist Beirut. This imagination becomes obvious when she
mentions how Zaitouna Bay gets on her nerves. Zaitouna Bay is one of the most recent
reflections of the molding Beirut into a capitalist consumptionist economy. It is part of
Solidere, a company that was head by former parliament president Rafic Al Hariri that
took on his shoulders the rebuilding of Beirut after the civil war, thus buying lands of
downtown Beirut causing a gentrification crisis. Moreover rebuilding a very modern
downtown that is based on consumption. The Beirut downtown nowadays has inside it
the parliament; couple of banks and the rest is a food court and highly expensive
shopping centers.
Zaitouna Bay on the other hand is the most recent addition to Solidere, where
Solidere did not only settle for downtown Beirut area, but also decided to privatize the
sea in the Biel area that is facing downtown from the seaside. The seaside now is a
parking for people’s boats and another food court where a certain class can afford to visit
it, and have a walk by the sea. Even though the place is opened for the public similar to a
Corniche where you can take a walk or bike, the feeling of the place is very uninviting to
less than upper middle class/upper class public. Moreover it is infested with security
guards that can at any point refuse to let a person in according to their own standards.
Another interlocutor that showed resistance towards the neoliberal mode of
urbanization of Beirut was Sara. Sara took her time while she imagined Beirut, was on
the contrary of most of my interlocutors not surprised by the question and did not seem as
if she never thought about it before like the rest stated.
It will have to be in a space that respect public space.
And by extension to respect the private space within
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public space, and individuals space within the private
space. It will have to be a far less pissing contest
between men, without having them asserting in
every second that this is their area. You are the
women, you are on my land, I (as a man) can
stand and piss in the street and you (as a woman)
cannot. I can (as a man) walk in the streets topless,
and you (as a woman) cannot. (Sara, January 2014).
Here I interfere by saying, well you can piss in the streets hypothetically speaking, but
what is at stake in that?
Of course you can, but you will be chased, attacked,
and also harassed. Women ask for permission when
they are in the public space, it is the territory of
men. Emancipation happens when nobody owns the
public. When it is a collective property. It might not be
only about women as well, if a man is walking in the
street, unless he looks like he is from the area he is
walking in, people should try not to make him feel
uncomfortable by existing in that area; dogs
and women included. Emancipation is not about
women only, it is about everybody coexisting in
the public space. The domestic worker and the
business man. If you are walking with a a person of
color, a darker person in Beirut, you realize you
are walking in a very different place, someone can
simply come and spit in your face. (Sara, January 2014)
Sara here reflects on a deep problem that Lebanon is facing nowadays, the racism against
domestic workers, foreigners and people of color. She resumes:
I imagine an emancipated Beirut where I can walk in the
street at any given time, and sit naked by my window.
These small acts that are derived from the feeling that if
I do so, nothing bad will happen. Moreover, I don’t want
to see men taking out weapons at each other. I just
want to walk, I just need to walk, open the door
get out and walk. An emancipated Beirut is a place
where you don’t need to make sure your
phone is working for emergencies, or hide a little knife
in order to protect yourself. Where you don’t need to
always be aware of faces around you so that if one
face is repeated too much that means that they are
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following you. You don’t need to think how drunk am I, or
how tipsy am I. Even if you are buying alcohol, you
don’t need to diversify where you buy your alcohol
from because I am a woman and I am living alone and
maybe someone will stalk me.
An emancipated Beirut is somewhere where I am not scared of bridges or the cars
stops to invite me in. A place where I don’t flip when someone talks to me in the streets.
Maybe as well, a place with lot of benches, few trees, where you can just grab a book and
go read, without having to make sure you have an alibi for being in the public. I
remember once I just grabbed a book and went to read in a public place and then it started
getting dark and someone had to stop and ask me what I am doing. I got scared,
obviously I am not supposed to be a girl sitting alone and just reading, what do you mean
reading? It’s not your space, why would a girl sit alone, you are just fishy. I am a person
who sometimes burst into walks and you have to always walk giving the impression that
you are heading somewhere, rushing as if you are going somewhere. And this is
something that is very interesting. If you see the men that are sitting in the streets, a guy
can just take his hooka and go and sit in the streets, sit around, they don’t need to be
doing anything, they are welcomed in the public. Now it is pragmatic because of course
they will be the first to be accused if something happened in the streets but it’s this
glorification of focusing on the social bond, women only do it in the private. When
someone is not there to judge them, because house work never end. You have to earn it,
and you have to be a mother to do a sobhiye ( a morning coffee party where women come
together, have coffee, talk and socialize). Moreover if you are still unmarried you don’t
do sobhiyet. I imagine Beirut where the urban environment is a healthy environment.
You have rules built for public engagement instead of building individual bonds and
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individual spaces, you have to make rule on the spots in the urban. (Sara, December
2013).
While I was interviewing Sara and listening as she drew for me her imagination of
an emancipated Beirut, the first thing that came to my mind as she talked was the article
of why loiter, the authors argue that the mere pleasure of being in the public space holds
the possibility of the public becoming a more friendlier place for women in public spaces
in cities. Moreover transforming women relationship with the city to a more inclusive
one. The authors as well stress on how rape, violence and sexual harassment have
become the major aspects in which mobilization of women rights took place. Where they
have become visible in hierarchal manner where other aspects of existing in the public
become minor compared to them (Phadke, Ranade & Khan, 2009).
Loitering authors claim is important because of its value by itself within a highly
consumerist capitalist society that reduces the public space for women into one that
entails them playing the role of a consumer or productive in it. “For loitering, the lack of
demonstration of a visible purpose is usually perceived as a marginal, sometimes
downright anti-social, even extra-legal, act of being in public city space” (Phadke,
Ranade & Khan, 2009 p.1). When Sara narrated the story of carrying her book and
simply going to sit in a public place doing nothing but reading, while she does not look
productive in capitalist terms, she was assumed by the people in the public as someone
either dangerous or in danger. But the danger in public space does not only come from
women in Lebanon, neither in India as the authors claim. It comes out of any nonproductive mobile body that does not have a purpose of either producing or consuming in
the public space. The poor in specific are perceived as dangerous mobile bodies.
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Moreover in the context of Lebanon the refugees and the others; especially what I
previously referred to as strangers. For example, most recently there was a very wide
spread phenomenon from municipalities to limit the mobility of refugee and migrant
workers for the sake of safety of the citizens. Huge signs were hung in neighborhoods
that prohibited any foreigner (read as Syrian, Sudanese, Egyptian or south East Asian
who are refugees, construction worker or daily paid labor workers) from going out to the
public after six at night for the safety and security of the local citizens.
Cities here are not assumed to be ones that are constructed and built spatially or
ideologically by themselves, or by authority as well. Cities and not only a product of
capitalism and neoliberalism, they are as well a product of the human beings that live in
them. “The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves, is, I want to argue, one
of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights”. (Harvey, 2008, p.23).
Harvey here hints on people making the city, while the city makes the people as well, it's
a cycle of both contributions into creating space. I resort again to the example of someone
asking Sara what is she doing while she read her book. The people in cities are not only a
target of loitering prohibition; they become as well agents of this prohibition by policing
each other, those who subvert from this constant mode of productivity – going
somewhere to do something – are constantly policed and estranged. Therefore when state
is missing in policing people, people themselves have become similar in their mode of
thinking and perception of the public as state. Thus leaving cities in a Harvey sense as
ones that are surplus values by themselves; simultaneously a product and producer of
surplus value.
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The prohibition and constraints of mobility towards foreigners in Lebanon
elaborates more and more how cities and the urban under capitalism and the
neoliberalisation of the urban are shaping the way the working class and the poor are
being pushed out of that city, unless they are there to labor for the rich. Urbanization
under capitalism, create hardships for working classes to maintain a good life in it,
therefore opening itself up through land prices and expensive apartment for the upper
class only, and marginalizing the rest of the population into the suburbs. Prices of land
along with signs of policing, limiting of mobility and constant policing by citizens to
noncitizens works hand in hand of shaping urban Beirut to a productive city where
pleasure includes consumption and excludes loitering and any other activity that is not
merely for productive purposes in the public.
Jihan on the other hand, imagined a different Beirut, a one that is less capitalist
and less violent on her own body and on the bodies of others.
Oh, it’s been a long time since I dreamt. Not to think
what I want to wear, I like choosing my clothe, but as
well I like on some days when I don’t feel like putting
effort into thinking what to wear, not to (not that I
do it when I don’t feel like doing it). What
I am wearing, who I am walking with, who do
I speak to in the street, if there’s a sidewalk or not,
if people will run over each other in the cars or not.
Not to worry about explosions blasting at any
second, no trash in the streets. Not a lot of advertising,
and for things to be accessible for everybody,
even the bodily disabled (Jihan, January 2014).
Jihan, as a lot of other people I interacted with in Beirut showed a high level of
anxiety and body awareness, due to the various tactics of advertising and commodifying
bodies as cite of making profit. It is common knowledge and a thing that you notice in the
streets, that Beirut is famous for having one of the highest rates of plastic surgeries in the
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world. This is mostly due to the way advertising portray people as humanly impossible
figures of beauty that redefines measures of beauty within a capitalist measures that are
projected through advertising. Having unattainable measures of beauty put people in a
point of always desiring these measures of beauty and adopting them as their own, mostly
opening doors of consuming beauty and skinning products. Therefore, Worrying about
what to wear does not come as a natural act, it is more a of a symbolic gesture of how
much the fashion industry and advertisement are rooted in the social perception of the
acceptable and the unacceptable ways to look. Both create constant awareness and selfsurveillance around commodities such as clothes and looks. Anxiety in that sense is not
one that is clinical, as it is not my area on any level to diagnose clinical anxiety, but the
use of term here is within the mainstream perception of anxiety. Anxiety as a sense of
body awareness and feeling threat of most of things around. The Institute of Precarious
Consciousness in their latest article argues that capitalism and the way it influences and
regulates people went through stages. The current stage, this age we live in is the age of
anxiety that tends to tame militancy in specific, under modes of surveillance from state
and people alike.
Today’s public secret is that everyone is anxious. Anxiety has spread from its
previous localized locations (such as sexuality) to the whole of the social field. All forms
of intensity, self-expression, emotional connection, immediacy, and enjoyment are now
laced with anxiety. It has become the linchpin of subordination” (Institute for Precarious
Consciousness, 2014).
Authors elaborate on how anxiety has become a trait in humans living in this
moment of history. All forms of connection and self-expression became saturated with
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anxiety. Jihan’s sense of discomfort with what to wear and who to speak to in the street
comes as an indication of how capitalism make one anxious about their bodies, and
consequently their human connections, especially in the public. What to wear means
choosing clothes that fits with the social perception of what is socially acceptable.
But what I would like to stress on the most is her statement is: “whom I am
walking with, and whom I speak to in the street”. This statement highlights the immense
amount of a police state Beirut has turned into the past couple of years.
The rise of explosions in Beirut since 2005 and the limitless assassinations of
politicians, up until today with the explosions blasting sometimes once a week or once a
month gave the Lebanese state the perfect reasoning for surveillance. The surveillance
can manifest itself in various ways, starting with faces that become too familiar in one
area and turn out eventually to be an army intelligence member, or random people from
state intelligence who wear civil clothes and at any given point can stop you in the road
and interrogate you. The latter can throw anyone at any given moment under the category
of a terrorist, or an outlaw. The latter hold the possibility of turning their lives upside
down, either through imprisonment or through constant conflict with the state.
This knowledge of and awareness that a lot of activists are conscious of made it
impossible for them to feel a sense of safety and belonging to the urban. Socializing, and
engaging in political debates in Beirut might be for some people a trigger for anxiety,
which limits human interaction in the public to less and lesser. Finally, it is noticeable
that this troubling sense of discomfort around the police state is so deep, that someone
would imagine emancipation as a Beirut without it.
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Another sense of discomfort of the heightening of capitalism in Beirut manifests
in another imagination of an emancipated Beirut.

For starters it wouldn’t have these little monoprixs
opening in every neighborhood, but we would see like
before those small shops owned by individuals not big
corporations. Did you see how they are opening in
every corner? It’s crazy. A cute little dekene
(little shop usually owned by a local individual)
owned by someone from that street living in that street.
It will have a lot of local products instead of Nestle
and all the other imported stuff. And next to it you will
have a bar that is owned by a person from that street as
well. The bar will have Lebanese wine and beer from Palestine.
It will be well lit at night for example. Your parking will not
be paid, you wouldn’t have a parking meter for example.
It will also have greenery, maybe a bench or something.
It wouldn’t have cars but bicycles only. And as a woman
I would like it to be a friendly street, not a hostile one
where you can pass by smile at a person and move
on with your day without being harassed as well.
(Layla, January 2014)
As most of my interlocutors, again Layla’s answer came as a reflection of this
discomfort. Her imagination is troubled by the fast and recurrent multiplication of big
corporate supermarkets that are taking over local smaller businesses that are usually a
source of living for working class families. The image of the big machine devouring the
small individual source of living resonates loudly in such an imagination. But what is
most significant about Layla’s imagination is how immersed it is with her activism work
around Palestine. Layla has been always one of the loudest voices in the Nasawiya
collective calling for an inclusive approach in the collective’s work within its feminist
politics. Layla in her descriptive imagination of emancipation dreamt of a Beirut where
you don’t find Nestle products. Nestle is on the top list of the products to boycott by the
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BDS movement that supports Palestine against the Israeli occupation and calls for
boycotting Israel economically and culturally alike.
The activism in support of the Palestinian cause in Lebanon against the Israeli
occupation was one of the core causes that Nasawiya took on publicly and bluntly despite
its conflictual nature, given the history of the Lebanese civil war and the war of the
camps. Especially that a lot of the public opinion is as I elaborated before, very sensitive
towards the strangers. Palestinians are as well perceived as strangers, regardless of how
long have they been in Lebanon, and whether they were born in Lebanon or not.
Sometimes, this opinion sneaked into the collective where a when in support of the BDS
movement – Nasawiya called for the boycott of Placebo concert in Lebanon sparked a lot
of fight within the collective, leading a lot of people withdrawing out of the collective.
Moreover put Nasawiya in the position of the far left “uncivilized” collective that is
interfering with cultural issues for political agendas. There were a lot of compromises
that the collective had to go through in order to take on the Palestinian cause as one that it
supports. For example, in another incident, one the members of the collective once ran
into a Lebanese famous blogger and human rights activist

in a protest where a

conversation took place and she asked him, how come you barely come to protests that
are organized by Nasawiya, he answered disgustingly “well you are the radical ones and
all, wearing your Koufiyas to every protest”
Within revolutionary struggles, patriarchal, racist, classist and so on codes and
segments can all reappear. These microfascisms spare no one. ‘Leftist organizations will
not be the last to secrete microfascisms,’ Deleuze and Guattari warn us. ‘It’s too easy to
be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you

118

yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective’
(Nail, 1987 p, 262).
Identifying as a leftist, or human rights activist does not mean anything other than
a empty label if subjects within movements do not challenge the tendency of fascism that
lurks inside everyone of us, due to our social construction as subjects of this system that
produce fascism as one of its faces. Especially in Lebanon, the story I narrated signifies
the tendency of high fascism even among activists who represent themselves as
progressive leftist human rights activist. Most importantly, the latter story captures a lot
about power and hierarchies of support in the Lebanese society. Wendy browns argue
that politicization introduces power where it was assumed not to exit before (Brown,
2002, p.568). By Nasawiya taking on the Palestinian cause as one of its fronts of
mobilization and politics, thus politicizing over and over again the Palestinian cause from
a feminist perceptive elaborates on her the power of the social of acceptance or rejection
plays a role of how a movement can collect public support or not. Moreover it questions,
what are the compromises that need to be done in order to get public support. By far,
Nasawiya prevails to take the Palestinian cause and the BDS tactics as one of its nonnegotiable causes regardless of its consequences regarding gaining more public support.
A tactic of speaking truth to power and articulating what many collectives failed to
confront: the Lebanese othering strategies and fascism.
This leads us to another imagination, one that captures strategically and
sarcastically the popular way the Lebanese perceive themselves. This perception of
course even if not obvious, is always with contradiction and comparison with the other
(who can be anyone else). Which leads to the next imagination: “where the Lebanese
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don’t think they are god gifts to the world” As for Soha and Jinan, their imaginations
stretched outside of Beirut.
I have a problem with emancipated Beirut because
it doesn’t include emancipated south Lebanon, I would
imagine it would have to be a secular political governance
system. That all of the current political families have
disappeared in the moon or something. An extremely
dimensioned power of religious clerics and institutions,
what people want to do with their own religion is to
be respected but diminish the political and legislative
powers of religious institutions, to may be part of
public debate about issues but not the power to legislate.
A space where I wouldn’t get stared at called at, whatever
no matter what I look or what I am wearing, where I wouldn’t
see ads that say “ now recruiting: a woman for work. A
nisa matlouba lil 3amal (women recruited for work).
When I walk up the store I am not asked if have money
or I speak French or whatever. I would consider a
public space that is very green and friendly and
older people and people with disabilities and
walkers and bikers. Maybe some cars.
I imagine it as a place that have more order and
where men don’t think their god gifts to women
and the Lebanese don’t think they are god gifts
to the world. Where people are treated equally
in all aspects of the law, whether citizens or not citizen.
Where I don’t hear or see racist or sexist jokes and
comments everywhere. (Soha, January 2014)
Soha reflected on a very important point with her imagination that stretched
outside of Beirut to capture a problem in Lebanon: only the political happenings that take
place in Beirut are the ones who manage to get the attention of the wider public. As I was
interviewing her, war in Tripoli still prevailed. The civil war between the Sunni and Shiaa
that spread from Syria to the very fertile social fabric of Lebanon, exploded in Tripoli due
to tensions between the Sunni and the Shiaa that have been building for a long time.
Especially after the seven days of civil war that sparked in Beirut in 2007 between Hezeb
Alla/The Amel movement and the 14th of march that included mostly Sunni from the
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future party and a minority of Druze from the Jabal area. There was barely any attention
on a political level given to the civil war in Tripoli apart from the few leftist activist that
agitated against it in Beirut. The political parties and the public in Beirut turned their
heads away from the happening in Tripoli using the argument of “al na’i bel nafs”
(isolation) based on the fear that this war will spill out to Beirut and consequently to the
whole country. Few local trials to end the Tripoli war were made from separate political
sides of Tripoli that resulted in a temporary decrease in the intensity of the events. The
Tripoli story again and again reiterates a recurring symptom of disfunctionality in
Lebanon, which is borders of interest in human lives and safety are bound by it's location
and not the fact that it's a life no matter where it is.
Also, Soha touched on the imagination of an occupation free Lebanon from Israel,
especially south of Lebanon who was liberated from the Israeli occupation by the
resistance forces of Hezeb Alla in year 2000. Moreover and due to the sectarian intensity
in Lebanon Soha dreamt of a non-sectarian government that is not run by clergymen and
its consequences as I elaborated in chapter one. She also touched on citizenship and the
situation of non citizens whom are mostly either strangers I discussed in the beginning of
this chapter, or the migrant domestic workers that still face racism on a social and
political level in Lebanon.
I end this chapter with Jinan, she as all the other interlocutors highlighted yet another
point about the urban, that it is rooted in patriarchy.
I guess I wouldn’t wake up in Beirut. Beirut is the
place where I learned what patriarchy means and
if I have the option to leave it I won’t say no.
We think that rural areas that send sexism to the urban,
but it’s completely the opposite. I guess I wouldn’t
wake up as pissed of as I am, it feel safer in the streets,

121

I would rather go out late at night rather than
during the morning. (Jihan, January 2014)
Jinan reflected mostly on how Beirut is patriarchal, where she stated that Beirut
taught her what patriarchy means. People think that the rural areas is where patriarchy
comes from, but given her experience, it is quite the contrary. Beirut’s image as the
perfect modern democratic state and perceived as one of the most liberal places in the
Arab world is highly hindered via this statement. A reflection that is mostly very real.
Even though Beirut is perceived as liberal, the situation in it is one where patriarchy still
prevails. On the other hand, she as well managed to deconstruct the relationship between
the urban and the rural where she the rural in her opinion was less patriarchal then Beirut,
against all the mainstream ideas that always perceives the rural areas as backwards.
These imaginations that mostly resonate a deep resistance towards capitalism and
neoliberalism elaborate how imagination by itself is a form of rupture of the narrative of
the everyday. Yes, most people imagine their lives in the everyday, but what happens
when they imagine emancipation, what doors does it open for mainstream scrutiny of the
Lebanese system. I wonder up until today if this question have influenced any of my
interlocutors, or our conversation about the law. Therefore this chapter is an invitation for
us all to pause and question, think and imagine.
Concluding Thoughts:
Without assuming that there was an Event, and the process is over.
To conclude is to put an end to a process, to assume that something is over, and
there’s a need for a last word. Therefore this is not a conclusion, this is an invitation to
imagine and question. To imagine an emancipated Beirut through my interlocutor’s eyes,
where it is a less hostile city towards women. Where you can walk in the street and see
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women hanging out in the streets smoking hookah, talking and debating politics, or any
other activity of choice. Imagine a less miserable society where in your neighborhood the
guy who you grew up buying gum from still owns his little shop, and you pass by
everyday to a familiar smile that brightens your day. Imagine the sea is for everyone, not
privatized, not commercialized, just have space for everyone to take a walk next to it
without the constant invitation of shop to consume, and without having to be from a
certain class to enter to the seafront. Imagine going out of your house without your
defenses and anxieties, without the fear and constant self-awareness from surveillance,
the one coming from the police or citizens alike. To walk without being scared to say hi
to another human being in the urban.
Imagine more trees and less advertisements billboards. More good mornings and
no news every single day that a person died from domestic violence, rape, famine, and
mysterious accident or from state violence. Imagine a Beirut without prisons, without
checkpoints, without the too many familiar faces of intelligence members, or the ones
that are not familiar. Imagine Beirut with no sectarian borders. Imagine Beirut where
religion is not the tool to produce difference and marginalize on its bases a minority and
engage in perpetual othering of strangers – the local from them or the foreigners – in
order to build a nation state. Imagine a Beirut where clergymen are just another part of an
ongoing political debate, rather than god representatives on earth and representatives of
the constant manufacturing of dogma. Imagine a prison-less Beirut, with no checkpoints;
no police in every five meters of the street, no explosions every couple of weeks. More
bicycles and people with disabilities enjoying the sea front because they have access to
tools that help them to get out of their houses.
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How would it look like if there were less malls, and more public parks? Less
religion more kindness. Less rushing into work, walking fast to avoid sexual harassment
or any type of other human intervention in your day, to enjoying a walk with fresh air at
night and watching how lights reflects from places on the waters of the city. It is that
hard? That hard to imagine an everyday that is as simple as this? Again, these are not
questions that need a yes or no answer; there are an invitation to think, whether why can
we imagine, or why not. Whether we like this emancipated Beirut, or we want our own
different version. All of this might sound like impossible things, far fetched dreams. But
think if them, these are not big events of revolutions, these are small events of the
everyday that gives a nice texture to one’s life. This is not utopia we are speaking of,
utopia in itself is problematic because it assumes there’s an arrival point, where justice to
all human being is achieved. Where emancipation is thought of in this thesis as a process
of constant becoming.
Even though this thesis works as a wider critique of the law and UN institutions
through the domestic violence law, it has to be acknowledged that yes movements for a
long time have used the law as a strategy to maneuver the power relationships with state.
To form little ruptures in the discourse that keeps producing more injustices everyday.
Kafa and Nasawiya’s effort might have not changed the law to a better one, or
emancipated women in Lebanon, but because of them, talking about domestic violence,
rape and marital rape are not a taboo anymore. And the discourse in discussing them is
molding more and more into a friendlier discourse towards women. That said, here I start
by concluding with more questions (favorite activity). So many efforts have been put in
mobilizing for the law in the past seven year, ones that as I suggested in this thesis as
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give tools for more control and surveillance for states in the name of protection. Yes there
were small victories, but those are the most dangerous ones of them all. Small victories
are the base of this constant crisis sustainability. If it wasn’t for the small victories, the
small portion of drugs that gives hope, thus keeps people hoping for more bigger
victories this system of oppression that keeps producing both oppression and victories at
the same time may fall. Victories, even though they feel great should not be seen as
happy moments, rather then scary moment, one that do not push the feeling of the
violence of the everyday to an unbearable level to the extent that someone would resist it.
Here I use the feeling of violence because I don’t mean to say that violence should
increase, violence whether with victories or not is increasing everyday as a product of the
social and economical neoliberal capitalist system we live under, but the feeling of
violence varies in time zones, depending on mobilizations and activism. Once we stop
feeling violent more and more as it gets normalized and the power relationships with state
get concealed, we are becoming more tolerant to the idea of being violated and unhappy.
A very unhappy nation state that is. In order to elaborate on this important point, I resort
to a piece of the little prince conversation with the king, when he was on the lonely king’s
planet, a planet with a king but no subjects to rule.
I have nothing more to do here," the little prince said to the king.
"So I shall set out on my way again.
Do not go," said the king, who was very proud of
having a subject. "Do not go. I will make you a Minister!
Minister of what?
Minster of−− of Justice!
But there is nobody here to judge!
Hum! Hum! said the king. "I have good reason to
believe that somewhere on my planet there is an old rat.
I hear him at night. You can judge this old rat.
From time to time you will condemn him to death.
Thus his life will depend on your justice. But you
will pardon him on each occasion; for he must be treated thriftily.
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He is the only one we have. (Antoine de Saint−Exupery, 1943, p. 29).

The king is king, but that king cannot be a king without subjects. Moreover, justice
cannot be just if it doesn’t simultaneously reproduce injustice. If there is no one to rule,
then there will be no law. If there is no one to protect, then why would there be
surveillance? If at this historical moment people did not aspire protection and ask for
justice from state, then injustice and the things we need to be protected from might seize
to sustain itself, thus seizing to exist.
Binaries. Oppression exists, work in binaries. It reproduces itself via binaries.
How? It is in what I referred to above as big loses and small victories. Oppression does
not sustain itself on big losses of human rights or imagined liberation. It sustains itself on
small victories. These anesthetic anecdotes of liberation are the food outside the cage of
the rat wheel.
Finally, if we imagine this system of oppression as one that is linked to neurons in
our brains, where it derives its sustainability from people’s belief in it, then the moment
we pause and question it, it might be the first step towards a process of non ending
negotiation with the world in order to be in a non ending process of emancipation. To
question what is at stake if we realize that our movements are constantly being absorbed
by neoliberalism is a first step towards emancipation. Moreover, this is an invitation to
question what is at stake if we dropped legitimizing state by giving it power to control
and try alternative ways of mobilization.
This is not the end, this is barely a trial of a minor rupture and an invitation to
imagine. If we stopped imagining we die, and the world is already full of too many
zombies.
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